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ABSTRACT 
 This Comment describes a compensation method for use with 
pharmaceutical compulsory licenses. Specifically, it proposes a me-
thod for determining “adequate remuneration” under the TRIPS 
agreement in a way that balances intellectual property rights with 
government obligations to promote the public health. Beginning with 
an introduction to U.S. patent law and its economic justifications, it 
describes the effects of U.S. policy choices on innovation within the 
U.S. pharmaceutical industry. Next, it describes the need for access to 
medicines in countries like South Africa and explains how patents 
block access in these countries—thereby necessitating compulsory li-
censing. Given the relationship between trade and intellectual proper-
ty, this nexus is briefly described and followed by a short introduction 
to the TRIPS agreement and the subsequent Doha Declaration. With 
this background in mind, and confined by the TRIPS requirements, 
this Comment describes a method for determining “adequate remune-
ration” so that courts can balance the need for technological innova-
tion with the need to access essential medicines, making both realities 
for the future. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 There is an emerging trend in the world, and some paint it as a 
threat to our future welfare.1 That trend is the growing use of com-
pulsory licenses in order to provide domestic generic pharmaceuti-
cals. These painters of a bleaker tomorrow complain not because 
compulsory licenses are forbidden, but because they are being used 
by the wrong parties and for the wrong reasons. Consequently, they 
warn, the widespread use of compulsory licenses could cost us our fu-
ture pharmaceutical resources, leaving us defenseless against tomor-
row’s diseases.2 
 A compulsory license is not a popular solution to any problem, but 
it is one the international community has endorsed in limited cir-
cumstances. Recently, for example, the community has authorized its 
poorest countries to use compulsory licensing as a means for battling 
diseases like HIV/AIDS, but only after certain conditions are met.3 
As the critics point out though, some countries are exploiting this 
freedom. Rather than use compulsory licenses to promote the public 
health, some countries appear to be using them to lower the costs for 
their own domestic pharmaceutical industries. By doing so, these 
countries shift costs to others who have made substantial invest-
ments in research and, by denying them the opportunity to recoup 
those investments, are hindering ongoing efforts aimed at battling 
tomorrow’s diseases.4 
 This shifting of costs was not the policy behind compulsory li-
censes for pharmaceuticals. Instead, the international community 
                                                                                                                     
 1. See, e.g., A Gathering Storm, ECONOMIST, June 9, 2007, at 71. 
 2. See id. (quoting the chairman of Novartis as saying that “ ‘without intellectual 
property there is no innovation’ ”). 
 3. See infra Part III (discussing the current international compromise regarding 
compulsory licenses). 
 4. At the forefront of those bearing these costs are large pharmaceutical companies 
who, fearing they will lose their investment in research, warn that compulsory licenses de-
ny them the resources necessary for continued innovation. Standing with them are coun-
tries like the United States who, having invested in intellectual property to drive technolo-
gical innovation, lose their international trade advantages when their technology is seized 
by other countries despite these countries’ capacity to pay. For a detailed discussion of the 
relations between compulsory licenses and their costs, see infra Part II.B. 
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adopted a policy that endorsed increased access to medicines for 
those who otherwise could not afford them by balancing access, 
which occurs through lower costs,5 with innovation, which is driven 
by intellectual property (IP) protection.6 In doing so, the internation-
al community empowered individual countries to make decisions re-
garding their own public welfare; but when some countries refuse to 
pay for their fair share of innovation, they upset the balance and put 
future medicines at risk. Moreover, because a compulsory license 
shifts costs, it distorts international trade and causes developed 
countries to implement trade barriers to protect their IP advantages. 
In the end, compulsory licenses are often blocked and their life-
saving benefits denied to those who need them most. 
 Thus, there is a need to bring the international solution back into 
balance, and this Comment examines how to do so by interpreting 
the compensation standard at the consequential end of the compul-
sory license decision. Specifically, this Comment proposes a compen-
sation standard that minimizes the cost-shifting aspects of a compul-
sory license so that research will not be hindered and trade will not 
be distorted. In doing so, it describes the essential conflicts in the in-
ternational patent system, outlines the current international com-
promise, and concludes by proposing a method for compensation that 
will balance the interests at stake. 
II.   THE INTERNATIONAL PATENT SYSTEM: INNOVATION, ACCESS,  
AND TRADE 
 In the international arena, differing economic maturities spawn a 
very complex patent system. In a developed economy, patents vigo-
rously protect technology because of policy choices sourced in the lo-
cal interest, particularly that of the domestic innovator who relies on 
the patent to recoup investments in research and development.7 
 In a developing economy, however, there is less technology to  
protect, and the local interest resides not in protection of technology, 
but in access to technology so that it may be borrowed for the benefit 
of developing industry.8 For this reason, patents are disfavored, but 
when patents protect medicines, their negative effects on the public 
health make them even less appealing. For example, in those  
developing countries that are helpless before diseases like 
                                                                                                                     
 5. See infra Part III. 
 6. See infra Part II (outlining the role of patent protection in driving innovation and 
the role of compulsory licenses in improving access). 
 7. KEITH E. MASKUS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 102 
(2000) (stating that inventors require stronger IP protection in a developed economy and 
drive demand for stronger IP rights). 
 8. Id. at 105 (explaining data that shows weak IP protection is correlated with de-
veloping economies). 
278  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:275 
 
HIV/AIDS,9 patents raise the prices of essential medicines and put 
them out of reach for dying patients. This takes an unacceptable  
toll on the rights of individuals to life and health, and as more re-
sources are directed to treating the disease, it cripples an already 
struggling economy.10 
 As a result, and as described below using the United States and 
South Africa as examples of countries from both ends of the economic 
spectrum, the conflicting local interests of the innovator and the 
struggling poor result in international pressures that materialize in 
international trade, eventually erupting into a conflagration.11 
A.   The U.S. Patent System and the Domestic  
Pharmaceutical Industry 
 The United States exemplifies a country with a well-developed 
economy and one that uses patents to protect its technology,12 max-
imize its trade advantages,13 and promote future innovation within 
its industries.14 This latter goal underlies the application of its patent 
laws, and the resulting system, many argue, is essential to innovat-
ing tomorrow’s medicines.15 
                                                                                                                     
 9. See, e.g., JOINT U.N. PROGRAMME ON HIV/AIDS, 2006 REPORT ON THE GLOBAL 
AIDS EPIDEMIC 4 fig.1.1 (2006) [hereinafter 2006 JOINT U.N. PROGRAMME ON HIV/AIDS], 
available at http://www.unaids.org/en/KnowledgeCentre/HIVData/GlobalReport/2006 (dis-
playing the growing number of orphaned children in sub-Saharan Africa as a result of 
HIV/AIDS on that continent). 
 10. See generally INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND HUMAN RIGHTS: FOUNDATIONS AND 
CONCEPTUAL ISSUES (Fredrick M. Abbott et al. eds., 2006) (containing articles that address 
the impact of patent protection on human rights). The social cost arises from the tempo-
rary grant of the monopoly to the innovator that accompanies the patent. By enabling the 
innovator to market his or her invention at a price higher than a directly competitive mar-
ket would allow, the patent provides the innovator a certain degree of pricing power. Given 
this pricing power, there is the possibility that the innovator may price out a large segment 
of the population. When the patent is protecting medicines, this practice can harm the pub-
lic health and, with it, economic productivity. See infra notes 85-90 and accompanying text. 
 11. See infra Part II.B. 
 12. See MASKUS, supra note 7, at 102. 
 13. See Gianna Julian-Arnold, International Compulsory Licensing: The Rationales 
and the Reality, 33 IDEA 349, 369 (1993) (“Under the theory of comparative advantage, a 
nation competes by taking advantage of those production factors which they possess in ab-
undance; thus nonprotection of intellectual property distorts trade, for it provides the pi-
rate with an artificial competitive advantage.”). 
 14. See generally FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER 
BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY (2003) (discussing the role of pa-
tents in spurring innovation in multiple industries, particularly in the pharmaceutical, 
biotechnology, computer hardware, and computer software industries). 
 15. See infra Part II.A.2. 
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1.   The U.S. Patent System: Economic Justifications and 
Enforcement 
 Patents, as an exception to the monopoly prohibition,16 are diffi-
cult to understand and enforce without also understanding the policy 
choices behind them. Existing at the intersection of the collective in-
terest and the individual right,17 they can be justified on several 
grounds.18 Yet, while anyone analyzing their role within the overall 
economy may find it hard to endorse the creation of a patent sys-
tem,19 it survives because it provides an incentive for innovation that 
promotes the public good.20 As the Court explained in Mazer v. 
Stein,21 “[t]he economic philosophy behind the clause empowering 
Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that en-
couragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to 
advance [the] public welfare through the talents of authors and in-
ventors in ‘Science and useful Arts.’ ”22 
 Accordingly, armed with this conviction23 and constitutional em-
powerment,24 Congress has enacted a statutory patent scheme25 that 
strives to advance the public welfare through the disclosure of tech-
nical information26 and provide incentives to invent27 that harmonize 
                                                                                                                     
 16. See 21 CONG. REC. 2457 (1890) (statement of Senator Sherman, sponsor of the 
Sherman Act) (describing the patent on the Senate Floor as “[a] limited monopoly secured 
by a patent right is an admitted exception, for this is the only way by which an inventor 
can be paid for his invention”). 
 17. THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 238-39 (James Madison) (E.H. Scott ed., 1894) (de-
scribing the Constitution’s patent and copyright clause as one sourced at the intersection of 
the individual right and the public good since “[t]he public good fully coincides in both cas-
es, with the claims of individuals”). 
 18. See ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW 
TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 2-20 (4th ed. 2006) (discussing multiple justifications, including those 
based on Natural Rights and Hegel’s Property Theory, both of which are beyond the scope 
of this Comment). 
 19. See SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE S. COMM. ON 
THE JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM, STUDY NO. 15 
58-62 (Comm. Print 1958) (prepared by F. Machlup) [hereinafter ECONOMIC REVIEW]. 
 20. See WENDY H. SCHACHT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., PATENT REFORM: ISSUES IN THE 
BIOMEDICAL AND SOFTWARE INDUSTRIES 2 (2006) (“Patent ownership is perceived to be an 
incentive to innovation, the basis for the technological advancement that contributes to 
economic growth.”). 
 21. 347 U.S. 201 (1954). 
 22. Id. at 219; see also Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480-81 (1974) 
(describing the patent grant as an incentive for inventors to risk both time and effort in the 
development of new products and processes so that, as a result, the public will benefit 
through increased employment and better livelihood from their introduction into society). 
 23. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
 24. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (patent and copyright clause). 
 25. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (2000). 
 26. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000). 
 27. See SCHACHT, supra note 20, at 4 (describing the two policy goals of the patent 
system as encouraging inventors to disclose technical information while also providing 
them with an incentive to invent). 
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with its underlying philosophy.28 Under this system, in exchange for 
the full disclosure29 of a product or process30 that is useful,31 novel,32 
and nonobvious,33 the inventor receives a patent whose accompany-
ing bundle of rights is enforceable for twenty years after the patent’s 
filing date.34 
 Amongst this bundle of rights, the most valuable is the right to 
exclude others from making or using the patented product or 
process.35 This exclusionary right enables the patent holder to recoup 
the original investment in the patented invention by prohibiting oth-
ers from practicing the invention and competing with the innovator 
                                                                                                                     
 28. According to the 1966 Report of the President’s Commission on the Patent Sys-
tem, there are four major economic justifications underlying the patent system: 
First, a patent system provides an incentive to invent by offering the possibility 
of reward to the inventor and to those who support him. This prospect encou-
rages the expenditure of time and private risk capital in research and develop-
ment efforts. 
Second, and complementary to the first, a patent system stimulates the in-
vestment of additional capital needed for the further development and market-
ing of the invention. In return, the patent owner is given the right, for a limited 
period, to exclude others from making, using, or selling the invented product or 
process. 
Third, by affording protection, a patent system encourages early public disclo-
sure of technological information, some of which might otherwise be kept se-
cret. Early disclosure reduces the likelihood of duplication of effort by others 
and provides a basis for further advances in the technology involved. 
Fourth, a patent system promotes the beneficial exchange of products, services, 
and technological information across national boundaries by providing protec-
tion for industrial property of foreign nationals. 
MERGES ET AL., supra note 18, at 17. 
 29.  35 U.S.C. § 112 (“The specification shall contain a written description of the in-
vention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, 
and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with 
which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best 
mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.”). 
 30.  35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (defining the category of patentable subject matter very 
broadly as any “process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any . . . im-
provement thereof”). 
 31. Id.; see also Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 528-29, 534 (1966) (stating that 
“one may patent only that which is ‘useful’ ” and describing utility as a necessary quid pro 
quo for the monopoly granted through the patent because it is the utility that benefits  
the public). 
 32. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (requiring novelty); 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2000) (defining novelty). 
 33. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000); see also MERGES ET AL., supra note 18, at 124, 225 (describ-
ing nonobviousness as the “ ‘ultimate condition of patentability’ ” and stating that it re-
quires an “ ‘inventive leap’ ” over what has previously been done to justify the grant of 
strong rights that accompany a patent). 
 34. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2000). 
 35. Id. § 154(a)(1) (defining the exclusionary right as the “right to exclude others from 
making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the United States or 
importing the invention into the United States, and if the invention is a process, of the 
right to exclude others from using, offering for sale or selling throughout the United 
States, or importing into the United States, products made by that process”). 
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on the market.36 If such competition arises during the statutory pa-
tent term, then the patent holder can enforce this right with a pri-
vate cause of action37 and seek statutory remedies38 in the forms of 
damages,39 injunctions,40 and sometimes attorneys’ fees.41 
 It is the enforcement of this exclusionary right that, like the en-
forcement of most rights under the law, sheds the most light on the 
patent system’s underlying policies and complexities.42 And, when en-
forcing this right, courts tend to rely on injunctions rather than 
damages43 partly because Congress has chosen patents as a vehicle to 
promote innovation44 and partly because patented technology is diffi-
cult to valuate.45 In taking this route, a court preserves the patent’s 
right to exclude because doing so blocks ongoing infringement and 
gives a potentially infringing party reason to license the patent in 
order to continue practicing the patented technology.46 Moreover, a 
court avoids the valuation problem because, when licensing the pa-
tent, the injunction places the patent holder in a superior bargaining 
                                                                                                                     
 36. See MERGES ET AL., supra note 18, at 1102. 
 37. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2000). One noted exception is for doctors performing an infring-
ing medical activity. 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(1) (2000). 
 38. Believing a private transaction is preferable to a legal one, some argue that a full 
range of remedies, including the infringer’s profits, should be available to the patent owner 
because it would make any contemplated infringement worthless and force a would-be in-
fringer to negotiate with the patent holder rather than infringe and await the legal conse-
quence. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 7-8 (2003). The idea that an infringer’s profits should be a 
damages measure has not been codified. However, damages can be enhanced up to three 
times the amount assessed. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000). 
 39. 35 U.S.C. § 284 sets the floor for damages at a reasonable royalty and allows for 
an increase in damages of up to three times the amount found. 
 40. 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2000). 
 41. 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2000). 
 42. A noted example of how policy choices can determine legal outcomes is found in 
Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805), where the majority of the court, which fa-
vored certainty, and the dissenting Judge Livingston, who favored the eradication of such 
“noxious beasts,” each came to separate and opposite legal conclusions. 
 43. MERGES ET AL., supra note 18, at 336. The Court has explicitly held, however, that 
the injunction is not the preferred remedy in an infringement action. See eBay, Inc. v. Mer-
cExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 392 (2006). Instead, underscoring the statutory language 
that injunctions “may” issue “in accordance with the principles of equity,” 35 U.S.C. § 283, 
and that their issuance is subject to the trial court’s discretion, see eBay, 547 U.S. at 394, 
the Court has emphasized the traditional four factor test that a plaintiff must meet prior 
to the issuance of an injunction. See id. 
 44. See eBay, 547 U.S. at 395 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (noting “the difficulty of pro-
tecting a right to exclude through monetary remedies”). 
 45. This difficulty is referred to as the valuation problem. See generally MERGES ET 
AL., supra note 18, at 336; ROGER M. MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON LICENSING § 2.79 (Matthew 
Bender 1990) (2008) (noting “that proof of damages is at best a difficult and elusive task”). 
 46. For a general discussion of the economics behind injunctions and their costs and 
benefits when compared to damage remedies, see Walgreen Co. v. Sara Creek Prop. Co., 
966 F.2d 273, 275-76 (7th Cir. 1992) (Posner, J.). 
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position47 where he or she can set a value on the patent and the 
terms and conditions surrounding its use.48 
 The right to exclude, however, does not end there. As a corollary of 
its strength, courts have held that a patent holder has full preroga-
tive and can refuse a license, should his or her terms be rejected, 
without fear of compulsion from the government.49 In other words, in 
the United States, while the government is free to issue compulsory 
licenses, it is rare that it will.50 In fact, the only times that courts will 
favor this route are when there is evidence of anticompetitive con-
duct51 or when legislation is triggered that protects the public inter-
est.52 In the special case, the public interest prong of the four factor 
 
                                                                                                                     
 47. Although its holding that the injunction was a preferred remedy in a patent in-
fringement action was reversed, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit described a 
natural consequence of the exclusionary right as the patent holder’s increased leverage in 
bargaining. MercExchange, LLC v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2005), rev’d, 
547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
 48. MERGES ET AL., supra note 18, at 336-37. 
 49. MILGRIM, supra note 45, § 8.55 (“In general, given the patentee’s freedom to refuse 
to license his invention, compulsory licensing is not a remedy available to an aggrieved 
competitor. In the usual case, therefore, absent some injurious or illegal conduct beyond 
the mere unilateral refusal to license, compulsory licenses will not be ordered either in pri-
vate suits or in government enforcement actions.” (citations omitted)). 
 50. A compulsory license is a license issued by the government against the patent 
holder’s will. Edmund J. Sease, Common Sense, Nonsense and the Compulsory License, 55 
J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 233, 233 (1973); see also John M. Wechkin, Drug Price Regulation and 
Compulsory Licensing for Pharmaceutical Patents: The New Zealand Connection, 5 PAC. 
RIM. L. & POL’Y J. 237, 239 (1995) (“A compulsory license . . . is an involuntary contract be-
tween an unwilling patent holder and a willing licensee, imposed and enforced by the state.”). 
 51. See, e.g., United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 340 U.S. 76, 94 (1950) (granting com-
pulsory licenses for violations of the Sherman Act); Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 
323 U.S. 386, 419 (1945) (granting compulsory licenses to alleged infringers when patentee 
violated the Sherman Act). See generally MILGRIM, supra note 45, § 8.55 (stating that “the 
rule of general application remains fixed: absent other anticompetitive conduct or public 
policy considerations, a patentee is free to unilaterally refuse to license and compulsory li-
censing will not be ordered”). 
 52. See, e.g., Clean Air Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 7608 (2000) (stating that when a pa-
tent is necessary for implementing a certain provision of the Clean Air Act, a court “may 
issue an order requiring the person who owns such patent to license it on such reasonable 
terms and conditions as the court, after hearing, may determine”); Atomic Energy Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 2183(b) (2000) (allowing for the licensing of patents relating to atomic energy and 
effected with the public interest); Plant Variety Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2404 (2000) (al-
lowing for the denial of injunctive relief when it is in the public interest to all others to 
grow the protected plant); Instances of Gov’t Subsidy, 35 U.S.C. § 203 (2000) (giving the 
federal government “march-in rights” for patents that were developed as part of a federal 
funding agreement). See also 28 U.S.C. § 1498, which has traditionally not been viewed as 
a compulsory license, but instead as an exercise of eminent domain. Sease, supra note 50, 
at 239. When 28 U.S.C. § 1498 is invoked and a patented invention is used or manufac-
tured by or for the United States without a license or other lawful right, the patent owner’s 
sole remedy is the recovery of reasonable compensation. 
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test for injunctive relief53 can also be triggered,54 and when it is, a 
court may favor damages over an injunction.55 When it does, a court, 
in effect, issues a compulsory license.56 
 Nevertheless, such outcomes are rare, and according to the  
Supreme Court, this evidences a legislative intent against compul-
sory licensing and favors the patent holder.57 This means that in the 
United States, without a general duty to license the patent,58 the pa-
tent holder rests securely in the exercise of his or her patent rights.59 
As a result, this security, which is sourced in the patent’s right to ex-
clude and Congress’s choice to use IP to drive innovation, grants the 
patent holder a limited monopoly in the invention and,  
as described below, encourages inventors to invent so that society  
can benefit.60 
                                                                                                                     
 53. 35 U.S.C. § 283 does not require a court to issue an injunction, but instead allows 
the court to issue injunctive orders in accordance with the principles of equity and on 
terms that the court deems reasonable. 
 54. See Sease, supra note 50, for a general survey of compulsory licensing incidents 
and the rationale behind their issue. These instances include the following: (1) those where 
equity finds an injunction to be inappropriate, see, e.g., Foster v. Am. Mach. & Foundry 
Co., 492 F.2d 1317, 1324 (2d Cir. 1974) (affirming the issuance of a compulsory license 
while describing the injunction as an inappropriate remedy when it would result in irre-
parable injury to the infringer without giving any resulting benefit to the patentee other 
than a “club” to be wielded in negotiation); (2) instances where nonuse by the patentee in-
trudes on the public interest, see, e.g., Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 
405, 405, 430 (1908) (noting that the patentee’s nonuse is not reason alone to deny injunc-
tive relief, but when a public interest is at stake because of the nonuse, injunctive relief 
may be denied); (3) instances where an infringement order would result in waste and deni-
al of a public benefit, see, e.g., McCreery Eng’g Co. v. Mass. Fan Co., 180 F. 115 (D. Mass. 
1910) (denying injunctive relief when it would result in the loss of ventilation to county 
courthouse); and (4) instances where an injunction would place the public health, welfare, 
and safety at risk, see, e.g., City of Milwaukee v. Activated Sludge, Inc., 69 F.2d 577 (7th 
Cir. 1934) (denying injunction when it would result in the shutdown of a city sewage plant 
and the dumping of raw sewage into Lake Michigan). 
 55. In all such instances, upon the finding of infringement, the patent holder is en-
titled to “damages adequate to compensate for the infringement but in no event less than a 
reasonable royalty.” 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000). 
 56. MILGRIM, supra note 45, § 8.55 (stating that the “refusal to enjoin future in-
fringement in such a case is tantamount to a mandatory license”). 
 57. Cont’l Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. at 429-30 (interpreting the lack of legislative activ-
ity in the area of compulsory licensing as reflecting Congress’s intent not to have general 
compulsory licensing). 
 58. Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 215 (1980) (noting that 
“[c]ompulsory licensing is a rarity in our patent system, and we decline to manufacture 
such a requirement”); see also id. at 215 n.21 (“Compulsory licensing of patents often has 
been proposed, but it has never been enacted on a broad scale.”). 
 59. Adi Gillat, Compulsory Licensing to Regulated Licensing: Effects of the Conflict 
Between Innovation and Access in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 58 FOOD & DRUG L.J.  
711, 714 (2003) (stating that patent holders have “full prerogative . . . in exercising their 
patent rights”). 
 60. See SCHACHT, supra note 20, at 2. 
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2.   The Pharmaceutical Industry: Linking Patents with 
Innovation 
 Patents benefit society in a number of ways, and although their 
specific role in each industry is unique, they are generally recognized 
for their ability to spur innovation.61 In the pharmaceutical industry, 
for example, patents are essential to motivating and directing future 
innovation,62 which generates new and better medicines for all.63 
 The incentive to innovate and invent is a function of four  
interrelated variables: (1) the costs of innovation and invention, (2) 
the risks, (3) the rewards for success, and (4) the rate at which com-
petitive imitation occurs.64 In the pharmaceutical industry, the pa-
tent preserves this incentive because after developing a new drug, 
patenting it provides a substantial reward that offsets the high costs 
of success. 
 Developing a new drug is extraordinarily expensive and highly 
unlikely to succeed. At least one author has indicated that the costs 
of developing a new drug can approach half a billion dollars while re-
quiring more than a decade to research, test, and obtain regulatory 
approval.65 Similarly, another author has discovered that only one 
percent of compounds researched make it into human testing and 
that because only twenty-two percent of those obtain approval from 
the Federal Drug Administration (FDA),66 the odds of a discovered 
compound becoming an approved drug can be as low as one out of 
four thousand.67 
 Therefore, to preserve the incentive to innovate, patents serve a 
reward function that offsets the high costs and extraordinary risks 
                                                                                                                     
 61. See Edwin Mansfield, Patents and Innovation: An Empirical Study, 32 MGMT. SCI. 
173, 180 (1986). See generally FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 14 (comparing the role of 
patents in promoting innovation across multiple industries). 
 62. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 14, ch. 3. 
 63. See infra notes 98-100 and accompanying text (discussing how patents generate 
social returns in excess of their costs). 
 64. See F.M. SCHERER, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF COMPULSORY PATENT LICENSING 
14 (1977). 
 65. Harvey E. Bale, Jr., Patent Protection and Pharmaceutical Innovation, 29 N.Y.U. 
J. INT’L L. & POL. 95, 95 (1996). Although the numbers cited by Bale are more than a dec-
ade old, time has not eroded their validity. In late 2006, the Congressional Budget Office 
reported that developing and bringing to market an innovative drug takes about 12 years 
and it takes an average of 11.8 years for a type of drug known as a new molecular entity. 
See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, U.S. CONG., RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE 
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 2, 20 (2006) [hereinafter RESEARCH IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL 
INDUSTRY], available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/76xx/doc7615/10-02-DrugR-D.pdf. 
 66. Henry Grabowski, Patents, Innovation and Access to New Pharmaceuticals, 5 J. 
INT’L ECON. L. 849, 851 (2002); see also RESEARCH IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY, su-
pra note 65, at 23 fig. 3-2 (reporting that about twenty percent of new molecular entities 
actually enter the phase for FDA approval). 
 67. Alan M. Fisch, Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceutical Patents: An Unreasonable 
Solution to an Unfortunate Problem, 34 JURIMETRICS J. 295, 303 (1994). 
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involved with bringing a new drug to market. That reward is a li-
mited monopoly grant that gives innovative companies the freedom 
to include both production costs and other expenses in the price of 
their drugs68 and positions them to appropriate at least part of their 
drugs’ social value.69 According to pharmaceutical representatives70 
and bolstered by studies,71 this freedom preserves continued innova-
tion within the industry. 
 In addition to providing a reward for success, patents fill a gap in 
legal protection and stifle competitive imitators that could otherwise 
copy the drug at less cost and risk than the innovator.72 Unlike the 
development of a new drug, which is a risky endeavor taking as long 
as fifteen years73 to research and costing as much as half a billion 
dollars,74 the development of a brand-name equivalent drug is a high-
ly successful endeavor costing as little as $1 to $2 million and can 
take only a few years.75 This places the imitator at a competitive ad-
vantage because, even though the imitator and innovator share the 
same marginal costs,76 the imitator pays substantially less for re-
search and can sell the brand-name equivalent drug at a discount.77 
                                                                                                                     
 68. Id. at 304. Although the patent rewards the inventor with a monopoly on the new 
drug, it does not confer a monopoly on the treatment of a disease. Drug companies are still 
forced to compete with other drugs in the same therapeutic class, which limits the monopo-
ly effect granted by the patent. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 14, ch. 3, at 10. 
 69. See Grabowski, supra note 66, at 850 (indicating that pharmaceutical companies 
rely greatly on patents in order to appropriate the benefits from their invention). 
 70. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 14, ch. 3, at 1. 
 71. See Mansfield, supra note 61, at 174 (citing studies that found ninety percent  
of pharmaceutical innovations would not have been introduced without patents, and sixty 
percent of pharmaceutical research and development funding was dependent upon patent 
protection); see also id. at 177 tbl. 2 (indicating that pharmaceutical companies patented 
more than eighty percent of their inventions from 1981 to 1983, which indicates their  
reliance on patents); id. at 175 tbl.1 (noting that of those inventions patented between 
1981 and 1983, sixty-five percent would not have been introduced if patent protection was  
not obtained, and sixty percent would not have been developed if patent protection was  
not available). 
 72. See infra notes 81-84 and accompanying text. 
 73. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 14, ch. 3, at 5. 
 74. Bale, supra note 65, at 95. 
 75. Grabowski, supra note 66, at 852. 
 76. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 38, at 313 (noting that in the pharmaceutical 
industry, marginal costs are low both for the innovator and the imitator). Marginal costs 
are the costs incurred for producing additional units of a particular good. Costs for labor 
and material are examples of marginal costs. E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & HERBERT 
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, POLICY AND PROCEDURE: CASES, MATERIALS, PROBLEMS 48 
(5th ed. 2003). 
 77. See Grabowski, supra note 66, at 851 (stating that “imitation costs . . . are ex-
tremely low relative to the innovator’s costs for discovering and developing a new com-
pound”); see also Bale, supra note 65, at 101, 106 tbl. 2 (showing how quickly imitators of 
the drug Tagamet (Cimetidine) took market share because their prices were so much lower). 
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 This is known as “free-riding,” and though it saves the consumer 
money,78 it limits the innovator’s ability to recover the original in-
vestment and attract additional resources for continued research.79 
To prevent this problem, patents step in where other forms of legal 
protection fail.80 In particular, pharmaceuticals find little protection 
as a trade secret because they are easily imitated81 and require ex-
tensive disclosure prior to regulatory approval.82 They are also not 
subject to copyright,83 and trademark law offers only a limited 
amount of protection after a significant period of time on the market.84 
 Therefore, without patent protection, innovative companies would 
have no means of preventing imitating companies from cheaply  
producing their drugs,85 and imitating competitors could enter the 
market freely and quickly erode the innovator’s early entry advan-
tage.86 The patent’s exclusionary right stifles this competition by 
granting a limited monopoly in the invention and secures the innova-
tor in the market.87 As a result, in the absence of competition, the  
innovator can recover fixed costs,88 regain previously invested re-
                                                                                                                     
 78. See Grabowski, supra note 66, at 851 (indicating that a generic drug does not have 
to recoup research and development costs like its brand-name equivalent and is cheaper as 
a result). 
 79. See SCHERER, supra note 64, at 20 (explaining that when imitation is swift and 
widespread, the imitators—and not the innovator—will reap most of the social gains as a 
result of the price competition); see also infra notes 87-90 and accompanying text (describ-
ing how patents are essential to funding research). 
 80. See ECONOMIC REVIEW, supra note 19, at 58-62 (describing the patent system as 
being designed to prevent free-riding). 
 81. See SCHACHT, supra note 20, at 5 (noting that it is relatively easy to chemically 
analyze and duplicate a pill, and for this reason, patents are especially important to phar-
maceuticals); see also Wechkin, supra note 50, at 241 (noting that “[p]harmaceuticals . . . 
are particularly easy to copy because ‘reverse engineering’ methods can be used to deter-
mine the constituent components of the drug”). 
 82. Gillat, supra note 59, at 723 (noting that the detailed disclosure requirements ne-
cessary for a drug’s regulatory approval deny the drug protection through trade secrecy). 
 83. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2000). 
 84. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 38, at 314 (describing how a drug’s trademark, 
in conjunction with the patent, creates reluctance in the consumer to leave the brand-name 
drug for the cheaper generic drug when the patent expires). 
 85. This may be an overstatement since circumstances may provide alternative reme-
dies under state law. The point is, however, that even in light of these remedies, none are 
as effective or as broad as those provided by a patent. 
 86. See SCHERER, supra note 64, at 23 (noting that an additional barrier to competi-
tion is the advantage that accrues to the pioneer who is first to place an innovative product 
on the market); Bale, supra note 65, at 101 (stating that when generic manufacturers enter 
the market, they quickly erode the innovator’s market share); see also, e.g., Theodore C. 
Bailey, Innovation and Access: The Role of Compulsory Licensing in the Development and 
Distribution of HIV/AIDS Drugs, 2001 J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 193, 204 (recalling that when 
the patent expired for the drug Librium, a precursor to Valium, its price dropped from $15 
to $1); Bale, supra note 65, at 106 tbl.2 (reflecting that when Tagamet’s patent expired, the 
patent holder’s market share declined from 100% to 45% in eight weeks). 
 87. See ECONOMIC REVIEW, supra note 19, at 58-62. 
 88. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 14, ch. 3, at 4. 
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search and development funds,89 and attract additional resources for 
future research.90 
 Besides attracting resources, a pharmaceutical patent has other 
beneficial effects. That is, the disclosure required of a pharmaceutical 
patent can maximize innovation efforts in ways beyond those that 
are directly beneficial to the patent holder.91 Using the information 
disclosed in the patent, competing companies can maximize innova-
tive research by minimizing duplication and directing efforts into  
areas not previously claimed.92 Similarly, after knowing what  
technology a patent protects, competing companies can “design 
around” the patent and develop noninfringing competition to the  
patented product.93 
 In the end, the fruits of these innovation efforts arrive to the mar-
ket in the form of new drugs that benefit society.94 As has been re-
ported, from 1981 to 1990, the pharmaceutical industry introduced 
over ninety percent of new FDA approved drugs,95 and when com-
pared to companies in countries with only “intermediate” patent pro-
tection, U.S. companies outpaced them more than two to one.96 Simi-
larly, when looking at the effects of strong patent protection in other 
                                                                                                                     
 89. See id.; see also LANDES & POSNER, supra note 38, at 313 (stating that thirty per-
cent of the cost of a new drug is related to research and development). Despite the patent 
monopoly, industry representatives have testified that most drugs do not generate enough 
in profit to cover their average development costs. As a result, brand-name companies rely 
on a small number of “ ‘blockbuster’ ” drugs to recoup their innovation investments, includ-
ing those made for failed products. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 14, ch. 3, at 5. 
 90. RESEARCH IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY, supra note 65, at 9-10 (noting that 
sales revenue drives research and development and reporting in Fig. 2-2 how the pharma-
ceutical industry’s level of investment compares to other industries); Bale, supra note 65, 
at 97-98 (indicating that the “ ‘research-based’ ” segment of the pharmaceutical industry 
depends upon patents and that even though patent protection results in a “ ‘monopoly’ ef-
fect,” this effect is necessary to fund the substantial investments in research and develop-
ment that are required for new drug development); Fisch, supra note 67, at 302 n.49 (re-
porting that in 1994, spending for research and development was projected to be 18.8% of 
company sales in the pharmaceutical industry). 
 91. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000) (requiring disclosure that would enable a person skilled 
in the art to make and use the invention); see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 14, ch. 
3, at 9 (describing the disclosure requirement as a trade-off for obtaining the right to ex-
clude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling an invention). This disclosure 
requirement harmonizes with the patent system’s underlying objectives. See supra note 28. 
 92. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 14, ch. 3, at 1. 
 93. Id. at 1-2. 
 94. This argument depends upon an inventor being motivated by the prospect of 
commercial success. There are exceptions where this will not always prove true. For exam-
ple, it has been suggested that partly because Alexander Fleming was not motivated by 
commercial success, it took an additional fifteen years to commercialize penicillin and to 
make it available for the market. See George E. Frost, The Case Against Drug Patent Com-
pulsory Licensing, 7 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. RES. & EDUC. 84, 100 (1963). 
 95. Fisch, supra note 67, at 302 n.46. 
 96. See Frost, supra note 94, at 98 (summarizing that during one specified period, for 
every drug produced in Great Britain, France, Germany, Switzerland, and Italy combined, 
the United States was producing more than two). 
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countries, the conclusion is much the same—strong patents lead to 
more and better drugs.97 
 For society, this means that even though pharmaceutical patents 
impose social costs, society reaps the greater benefit because new 
and better drugs increase longevity, enhance the quality of life,  
and improve both labor force participation and productivity.98 Thus, 
while the patent system allows the inventor to appropriate the social 
value of his or her invention in the form of a private return,99 the re-
ality is that the inventor’s return falls short and society reaps the 
greater benefit.100 
B.   Patents in the Developing World: Access and the  
Compulsory License 
 While countries like the United States reap the benefits of better 
drugs and can afford to grant strong patent protection to their inno-
vators, the reach of their patents and associated rights are limited.101 
This leaves an innovator seeking foreign patent protection at the 
mercy of individual patent systems.102 Because patents are a reflec-
tion of policy, their associated rights can vary according to the choic-
es of individual countries.103 Thus, while the United States prefers 
strong patent rights to spur innovation,104 developing countries find 
them unpalatable, particularly when dealing with medicines essen-
tial to the long-term survival of their people. As a result, they en-
dorse choices that erode IP rights and entangle themselves in inter-
national disputes. 
1.   The Clash Between Innovation and Access 
 Unlike in the United States, in a developing economy, strong pa-
tent enforcement is not generally seen as a tool for promoting the 
public welfare. Instead, patents impede economic growth and impose 
                                                                                                                     
 97. Grabowski, supra note 66, at 853-54 (arguing that strong patent protection for 
drugs is essential to new product introductions and to the prosperity of the drug industry 
while also summarizing the effects of stronger patent protection on the drug industries in 
Canada and Japan). 
 98. Id. at 849-50. 
 99. See ECONOMIC REVIEW, supra note 19, at 58-62. 
 100. See Gillat, supra note 59, at 715 (citing studies that conclude that the typical in-
novator captures, at most, only forty-five percent of the social returns on his or her innovation). 
 101. Wechkin, supra note 50, at 239 (noting that patents are limited to the jurisdiction 
of the laws in the issuing country). 
 102. See MERGES ET AL., supra note 18, at 330 (stating that most businesses seeking in-
ternational patent protection turn to the laws of individual countries in order to obtain 
that protection). 
 103. Compare supra notes 42-60 and accompanying text with infra notes 105-30 and 
accompanying text. 
 104. See supra Part II.A. 
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social costs in excess of any gains they could be expected to return.105 
To control these effects, a developing country must intervene through 
negotiation with the patent holder or intrusion on the patent, and 
more often than not, intrusion in the form of a compulsory license is 
likely the best course for pharmaceutical patents.106 
 When a developing country issues patents for foreign medicines, 
its already struggling economy finds itself shouldering another load. 
Specifically, granting a patent for a foreign product can cost an econ-
omy technological advantages that would otherwise promote its in-
dustry and benefit its citizens. In terms of industry, productivity is 
lost when patents prevent imitators from pirating the technology for 
local production,107 and when local production is denied, there is no 
opportunity for technology transfer.108 This leaves local consumers 
dependent on foreign goods without the benefit of local competition, 
and absent competition, consumers are forced to pay higher prices.109 
When these goods are medicines, these higher prices injure the pub-
lic health because when drugs are not readily available, treating and 
diagnosing disease is more difficult.110 
 Consequently, a developing country facing a health crisis finds it-
self in a difficult position. To provide access to medicines that would 
combat the crisis, it can take a passive approach and rely on drug 
donations from charities and pharmaceutical companies.111 Alterna-
                                                                                                                     
 105. EDITH TILTON PENROSE, THE ECONOMICS OF THE INTERNATIONAL PATENT SYSTEM 
226 (1951) (noting that granting patents on foreign imports results in social costs such as 
higher prices, royalty payments to foreign patent holders, and the lost ability to use new 
techniques that far exceed any benefit derived from granting the patent protection). 
 106. There are two methods of reducing social costs that result from granting patents 
on foreign inventions. Id. at 230. One is the ineffective compulsory working requirement. 
Id. The other is the more effective and flexible compulsory licensing requirement men-
tioned here. Id. at 231. 
 107. See Julian-Arnold, supra note 13, at 356 (citing sources and explaining the effects 
of piracy and counterfeiting on the economies in developing countries). 
 108. See id. at 357. As a result of this concern, developing countries have contracted  
directly with pharmaceutical companies to have them build domestic production facilities 
in order to achieve technology transfer as well as to spur the developing country’s technical 
capacity. Thomas F. Mullin, AIDS, Anthrax, and Compulsory Licensing: Has the United 
States Learned Anything? A Comment on Recent Decisions on the International Intellectual 
Property Rights of Pharmaceutical Patents, 9 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 185,  
192 (2002). 
 109. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text (describing how patents enable the 
patent holder to charge higher prices to recoup past expenses and to gather future funds 
for research and development). 
 110. See Thomas J. Bollyky, Balancing Private Rights and Public Obligations: Consti-
tutionally Mandated Compulsory Licensing of HIV/AIDS Related Treatments in South 
Africa, 18 S. AFR. J. ON HUM. RTS. 530, 531 (2002). 
 111. See, e.g., Jeanne Whalen, Glaxo to Cut Prices in Poor Countries, WALL ST. J., Feb. 
14, 2009, at B5 (“GlaxoSmithKline PLC, the world’s second-biggest drug maker by sales, 
plans to cut prices in the world’s poorest countries and invest 20% of its profit from those 
markets into building health clinics and other infrastructure.”); see Bollyky, supra note 
110, at 537; Grabowski, supra note 66, at 857-58. 
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tively, it can be proactive and negotiate bilaterally, purchase in bulk, 
or issue compulsory licenses.112 
 Of these choices, the availability of limited funds for medical 
treatment often leaves compulsory licensing as the only choice for 
those countries wishing to be proactive. In Africa, for example, where 
HIV/AIDS is ravaging the population, its nations are limited to 
budgets of less than ten dollars per capita for medicines annually.113 
Meanwhile, the annual price of treatment for the disease can be as 
high as several thousand dollars a year.114 This means that while bi-
lateral negotiations115 and bulk purchasing efforts116 enable a country 
to achieve some price reductions, the savings they generate are often 
not enough to make it worthwhile.117 A compulsory license, on the 
other hand, increases the government’s bargaining power,118 opens 
the door to more competition, and leads to significant price reduc-
tions.119 For this reason, although compulsory licenses are rare,120 the 
promise of immediate cost savings make them very appealing for 
                                                                                                                     
 112. See Bollyky, supra note 110, at 533, 537. 
 113. Tina Rosenberg, Look at Brazil, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2001, § 6 (Magazine), at 26. 
 114. Bailey, supra note 86, at 196 (describing that access to AIDS drugs is almost  
impossible in nations like South Africa where the annual per capita income is $6,000 and  
a year’s supply of AIDS treatment can cost more than $750 a month and up to $12,000  
a year). 
 115. See, e.g., Mullin, supra note 108, at 200-02 (discussing how the United States and 
Canada negotiated with Bayer AG to lower the price of Cipro, the first FDA approved drug 
for treating Anthrax infections, after the Anthrax attacks in 2001). 
 116. See, e.g., Wechkin, supra note 50, at 238 (discussing how New Zealand has placed 
increased reliance on price regulation as a means for controlling drug prices). 
 117. See Grabowski, supra note 66, at 856 (noting that low prices on drugs alone do  
not result in adequate utilization of those drugs because of the limited funds available  
for medicines). 
 118. See, e.g., Ubirajara Regis Quintanilha Marques et al., Brazil AIDS Controversy: 
Antiretroviral Drugs, Breaking Patents, and Compulsory Licensing, 60 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 
471, 474 (2005) (indicating that the mere possibility of a compulsory license pressures 
global pharmaceutical companies to lower their prices); Mullin, supra note 108, at 192-94 
(discussing the increased bargaining power that the South African government enjoyed af-
ter it contemplated the use of compulsory licensing and the significant savings that re-
sulted because drug manufacturers were much more willing to lower their prices to avoid 
the license). 
 119. “The effect of a compulsory license is to force a patent holder to license the inven-
tion to others in return for a royalty set by the government.” Wechkin, supra note 50, at 
237. Through the issuance of the license, competition is stimulated and prices are lowered 
because of the availability of low-priced generics that are manufactured or imported by 
third party licensees. Bollyky, supra note 110, at 533. 
 120. Sease, supra note 50, at 236. The rare instances when compulsory licensing has 
been used include those “where a dependent patent is being blocked, where a patent is not 
being worked, or where an invention is related to food or medicine.” Julian-Arnold, supra 
note 13, at 349-50 (summarizing compulsory licensing provisions in selected countries); see 
also ECONOMIC REVIEW, supra note 19, at 13 (stating that, in addition to using compulsory 
licenses as a penalty or remedy for abuse, some countries use them “to safeguard the pub-
lic interest”); Sease, supra note 50, at 235 (describing compulsory licensing as being used 
in foreign countries as a sanction when there is insufficient use within the country to satis-
fy the demand). 
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governments needing to reduce the price of pharmaceuticals, despite 
their potential effects on future innovation.121 
 The best example of this has occurred in Brazil, which some have 
described as a “beacon among developing countries.”122 In Brazil, the 
government has achieved significant pharmaceutical price reductions 
by forcing pharmaceutical companies to manufacture their drugs lo-
cally and by threatening compulsory licenses.123 As a result, Brazil 
has contained the spread of HIV/AIDS and stabilized the disease.124 
In the process, Brazil has saved over $422 million between 1997 and 
1999 to offset the $444 million it spent on drugs in 2000.125 
 With such promising results, it is little wonder that countries like 
South Africa, which is battling one of the most severe HIV/AIDS epi-
demics in the world, have turned to compulsory licensing. According 
to 2006 UNAIDS estimates, by the end of 2005, 5.5 million people 
were living with HIV in South Africa and almost 1,000 people were 
dying from AIDS every day.126 Based on 2002 data, the disease was 
predicted to shrink the South African GDP by 17% and reduce output 
by $22 billion in 2010.127 
 Faced with such staggering consequences of inaction on the one 
hand and a constitutional mandate to improve access to health care 
on the other,128 South Africa became proactive. In 1997, it passed the 
Medicines and Related Substances Control Act, empowering the 
South African Minister of Health to issue compulsory licenses for 
HIV/AIDS drugs for domestic manufacture.129 It was hoped that this 
would lower the costs of new antiretroviral drugs, allowing South 
Africa to capitalize on their effectiveness and contain the disease.130 
Instead, it ignited a firestorm. 
                                                                                                                     
 121. See Wechkin, supra note 50, at 240. 
 122. Marques et al., supra note 118, at 472. 
 123. In 2003, for example, the annual treatment cost for an AIDS patient in Brazil was 
$2,000, as compared to $15,000 in the United States. Id. at 472. Furthermore, Brazil has 
significantly reduced the production costs of other drugs, including 59% for Efavirenz, 65% 
for Nelfinavier, 64% for Nelfinavir, and 63% for Invirase® and Fortovase®. Id. at 474. 
 124. Rosenberg, supra note 113, at 26 (stating that Brazil has “cut the AIDS death rate 
nationally by about 50 percent” and that “each AIDS patient is only a quarter as likely to 
be hospitalized as before”). 
 125. Mullin, supra note 108, at 195. 
 126. See 2006 JOINT U.N. PROGRAMME ON HIV/AIDS, supra note 9, annex 1, at 455 (es-
timating that between 270,000 and 380,000 people died in South Africa as a result of 
HIV/AIDS in 2005 and that between 4.9 million and 6.1 million people have the disease). 
 127. Keith E. Maskus, Ensuring Access to Essential Medicines: Some Economic Consid-
erations, 20 WIS. INT’L L.J. 563 (2002). Fortunately, the tide is beginning to turn for rea-
sons mentioned below, and 2010 does not look as bleak as it did before. See infra notes 144-
47 and accompanying text. 
 128. See Bollyky, supra note 110, at 532. 
 129. Bailey, supra note 86, at 195. 
 130. See Bollyky, supra note 110, at 534 (stating that new antiretroviral drugs have 
slashed mortality rates by seventy percent when compared to previously available treatment). 
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2.   Compulsory Licensing and the International Consequences  
 The promise of immediate and improved access to brand name 
HIV/AIDS drugs is definitely alluring, but issuing or threatening a 
compulsory license has consequences. Compulsory licenses not only 
reduce foreign investment, they also impose costs related to litiga-
tion, safety, and efficacy.131 More importantly, a compulsory license 
can to lead to trade sanctions, especially from the United States, that 
halt the license altogether. 
 The impetus behind such sanctions is the view that when a nation 
issues a compulsory license, it reaps the benefits of a substantial re-
search and development investment without contributing its fair 
share to the costs.132 As one author has stated: 
 Research in the area of pharmaceuticals is so expensive that 
any country attempting to take a free ride on such research 
through the use of compulsory licensing is certain to be a target of 
severe international criticism. While developing countries have a 
justifiably strong interest in insuring that foods and medicines are 
available to their citizens at a reasonable price, they also have a 
strong interest in providing the incentive to research those diseas-
es particular to the developing nations.133 
 In addition, by taking the “free ride” on research with the  
compulsory license, a country reaps a competitive trade advantage 
because its manufacturers do not have the burden of the substantial 
research and development costs.134 This distorts trade, denies innova-
tors the opportunity to recoup their own investments, and prohibits a 
developed country from taking advantage of its IP on the interna-
tional market.135 
 To avoid this, developed countries like the United States use trade 
sanctions and other forms of political pressure against those coun-
                                                                                                                     
 131. See id. at 543-44; see also NUNO PIRES DE CARVALHO, THE TRIPS REGIME OF 
PATENT RIGHTS 316 (2d ed. 2005) (noting that compulsory licensing discourages the estab-
lishment of independent, research-based industries that would be valuable in serving the 
local market). 
 132. See Julian-Arnold, supra note 13, at 357-58. 
 133. Id. at 368. 
 134. The effect of not protecting intellectual property among nations is an outgrowth of 
the effects within industry. For example, in the context of pharmaceuticals, the ability of a 
generic manufacturer to “free-ride” on the research and development of the innovator plac-
es the generic at a significant market advantage because, without having to recoup the 
same investment costs, it can place an equivalent product on the market for much less. 
When this generic manufacturer places its product in channels of international trade, 
these effects are magnified and the competitive advantage turns into a trade advantage. 
See DE CARVALHO, supra note 131, at 35-36. 
 135. See Julian-Arnold, supra note 13, at 369 (discussing the theory of comparative ad-
vantage in international trade and how the nonprotection of intellectual property puts a 
pirating country at an advantage). 
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tries whose IP protection is not similar in strength to their own.136 In 
the United States, the “Special 301” provisions of the Trade Act of 
1974, as amended, empower the U.S. Trade Representative to identi-
fy, categorize,137 and investigate foreign countries with inadequate IP 
protection for possible future action.138 If a country’s IP protection 
falls below the expected threshold, then it is placed on either the 
Priority Watch List—where it is subject to further monitoring and 
possible subsequent action—or the Watch List—where it is recom-
mended for subsequent action.139 Oftentimes, such action is in the 
form of highly persuasive trade sanctions that are meant to encour-
age a Priority Watch List country to update its IP policies,140 and of-
ten these sanctions succeed.141 
 This was the firestorm that engulfed South Africa. After that 
country passed the Medicines and Related Substances Control Act, 
the United States placed it on the Watch List, and although no trade 
sanctions followed, the mere fear that they would led South Africa to 
delay implementing its law.142 Despite this delay, in response to the 
Act and as a testament to the effectiveness of compulsory licensing, 
drug manufacturers significantly lowered their prices and no doubt 
increased access to essential medicines for South Africa and  
its citizenry.143 
 The rest of the world has also responded. In 2003, the United 
States began providing direct relief to HIV/AIDS patients via the 
President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief.144 Under this plan, the 
United States has provided over $15 billion and will provide $39 bil-
                                                                                                                     
 136. Mullin, supra note 108, at 198. 
 137. Countries are categorized accordingly in the following groups: (1) Priority Foreign 
Country; (2) Section 306 Monitoring; (3) Priority Watch List; and (4) Watch List. See U.S. 
TRADE REP., 2005 SPECIAL 301 REPORT 1 (2005) [hereinafter SPECIAL 301 REPORT]. 
 138. See 19 U.S.C. § 2242(g) (2000) (requiring an annual report to Congress from the 
U.S. Trade Representative identifying foreign countries that do not provide adequate intel-
lectual property protection as well as actions taken against them during the preceding 
twelve months). See generally SPECIAL 301 REPORT, supra note 137, at 14 (providing an 
overview of the statutory reporting process). 
 139. SPECIAL 301 REPORT, supra note 137, at 14. Subsequent action is authorized by 
statute. 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (2000) (authorizing unilateral action against foreign nations that 
pursue discriminatory trade practices, including those nations that do not provide ade-
quate intellectual property protection). 
 140. Rosenberg, supra note 113, at 26 (noting that a country’s inclusion on the Special 
301 Watch List is a precursor to trade sanctions). 
 141. See Wechkin, supra note 50, at 243-45 (describing how New Zealand’s policies, 
which were related to compulsory licensing and pharmaceuticals, were repealed after the 
United States took the described actions). 
 142. See Kathy Chenault et al., Will the AIDS Plague Change U.S. Trade Policy?, BUS. 
WK., Sept. 13, 1999, at 58; see also Patrick Marc, Compulsory Licensing and the South 
African Medicine Act of 1997: Violation or Compliance of the Trade Related Aspects of Intel-
lectual Property Rights Agreement?, 21 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 109, 110 (2001).  
 143. See Mullin, supra note 108, at 193. 
 144. About PEPFAR, http://www.pepfar.gov/about/index.htm (last visited Apr. 11, 2009). 
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lion more to combat the spread of AIDS worldwide.145 Other countries 
and international actors have likewise weighed in to combat the 
spread of the disease.146 As a result of their efforts, more than two 
million African patients have access to HIV/AIDS drugs that did not 
before.147 This increase in access to medicine has lowered the death 
rate and controlled the spread of the disease,148 but because the ef-
forts are charitable, this leaves countries like South Africa reliant on 
others’ goodwill to battle their health epidemics. Consequently, there 
is still a need for a comprehensive, international solution that em-
powers them to be proactive without fear of international retribution. 
As time goes on, this need continues to grow. 
III.   TRIPS, DOHA, AND THE CURRENT COMPROMISE 
 Trade disputes like the one above in South Africa did not go unno-
ticed. While they played out on the world stage, countries recognized 
that there was a nexus between trade and IP, and as IP became in-
creasingly important to the developed world,149 these countries saw 
that trade could be used as a vehicle for international IP harmoniza-
                                                                                                                     
 145. See Win Some, Lose Some: The XVIIth International Aids Conference, ECONOMIST, 
Aug. 9, 2008, at 75 (stating that the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief “provides 
for $39 billion to be spent on AIDS over the next five years, up from $15 billion for the past 
five”). 
 146. See, e.g., Whalen, supra note 111 (reporting that GlaxoSmithKline PLC “already 
sells its HIV drugs in these [poor] countries at not-for-profit prices, and if those prices 
aren’t already lower than 25% of the developed-world price, they will be reduced”); see 
JOINT U.N. PROGRAMME ON HIV/AIDS, 2008 REPORT ON THE GLOBAL AIDS EPIDEMIC 136-
38 (2008) [hereinafter 2008 JOINT U.N. PROGRAMME ON HIV/AIDS], available at 
http://www.unaids.org/en/KnowledgeCentre/HIVData/GlobalReport/2008/2008_Global_report.asp 
(describing various ongoing efforts around the globe aiming to combat the spread  
of HIV/AIDS). 
 147. See U.S. President’s Plan for Aids Relief, World AIDS Day 2008: Celebrate Life!, 
http://www.pepfar.gov (last visited Apr. 11, 2009) (“When President George W. Bush an-
nounced PEPFAR in 2003, it was estimated that only 50,000 people were receiving treat-
ment for HIV/AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa. Today, PEPFAR supports treatment for more 
than 2 million people in sub-Saharan Africa—forty times the number receiving treatment 
only five years ago.”); see also Getting the Message, ECONOMIST, June 7, 2008, at 91, avail-
able at http://www.economist.com/science/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11487365 (showing 
that according to the World Health Organization, over 2 million people are receiving anti-
AIDS drugs in sub-Saharan Africa); Kimberley A. Strassel, Editorial, The Weekend Inter-
view: Bush on His Record, WALL ST. J., Dec. 20, 2008, at A13 (noting that PEPFAR has 
“provided antiretroviral drugs to 2.2 million African HIV-AIDS victims”). 
 148. See 2008 JOINT U.N. PROGRAMME ON HIV/AIDS, supra note 146, at 134 (“After 
decades of increasing mortality, the annual number of AIDS deaths globally has declined 
in the past two years, in part as a result of the substantial increase in HIV treatment 
access in recent years.”). 
 149. As Professor Maskus has shown, strong intellectual property protection is a by-
product of a growing and sophisticated economy. See MASKUS, supra note 7, at 102. 
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tion.150 Consequently, they adopted new international trade agree-
ments aimed at standardizing substantive IP protections. 
 Leading the way were the United States and Europe with a push 
to revise the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) at the 
Uruguay Round. As part of the Marrakesh Agreement, they pushed 
for the adoption of the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS) annex and succeeded in doing so.151 This was a revo-
lutionary international development. With the adoption of TRIPS, 
there was an international power shift from the World Intellectual 
Property Organization (WIPO)—a body acting under the United Na-
tions that had routinely failed to obtain substantive harmoniza-
tion152—to the WTO, which was a successor to the GATT. More im-
portantly, the agreement’s broad scope encompassed areas that pre-
vious agreements covered separately153 and, for the first time, in-
cluded provisions for the enforcement of IP rights.154 Consequently, 
TRIPS has been described as the most “comprehensive international 
agreement on intellectual property protection ever established.”155 
 The main objective of TRIPS is to promote free trade.156 With a 
mandate “to reduce the distortions and impediments to international 
trade, taking into consideration the need to promote effective and 
adequate protection for intellectual property rights,”157 it aims to re-
medy differences in IP protection158 and to protect private property 
rights from arbitrary government acts.159 
 The compulsory licensing of pharmaceutical patents could argua-
bly be categorized as an arbitrary government act, but this is not 
necessarily the case under TRIPS. While an arbitrary compulsory li-
cense, which seizes an IP right,160 would be contrary to the mandate 
                                                                                                                     
 150. Prior international agreements, like the Paris Convention of 1883 and the Patent 
Cooperation Treaty, were focused primarily on streamlining international procedures and 
had few substantive aspects. See MERGES ET AL., supra note 18, at 331-33. 
 151. See Mullin, supra note 108, at 187. 
 152. See Susan Vastano Vaughan, Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals Under 
TRIPS: What Standard of Compensation?, 25 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 87, 93 
(2001) (stating that “WIPO negotiations, whether viewed as favorable to developing or de-
veloped countries, were routinely stymied”). 
 153. See MERGES ET AL., supra note 18, at 330-33 (describing how the Paris Convention 
and the Patent Cooperation Treaty focused primarily on procedure and stating that indi-
vidual treaties were used to provide substantive protection). 
 154. DE CARVALHO, supra note 131, at 28-29. 
 155. Id. at 28. 
 156. Id. at 35. 
 157. See Julian-Arnold, supra note 13, at 370 (citing the Ministerial Declaration on the 
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations—Statement by the Chairman, 25 
I.L.M. 1623 (1986)). 
 158. DE CARVALHO, supra note 131, at 30. 
 159. Id. at 35. 
 160. IP rights are considered private property rights under TRIPS and are therefore 
protected from arbitrary government acts. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intel-
lectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World 
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above, one that serves a public purpose161 and is justified on social 
and collective interests162 is categorically not. Under TRIPS, promo-
tion of the public health is socially and collectively justifiable, and it 
allows its members to adopt any means necessary to serve this end 
as long as they are consistent with the remainder of the agreement.163 
This includes using compulsory licenses for pharmaceuticals.164 
 After its passing, though, members continually wrestled with in-
terpreting the agreement and with defining the appropriate bases for 
issuing a compulsory license. According to Article 31(b), a compulsory 
license may issue only once “efforts to obtain authorization from the 
right holder on reasonable commercial terms and conditions” have 
failed after a reasonable period of time.165 This negotiation require-
ment is dispensed with in cases of “national emergency or other cir-
cumstances of extreme urgency,”166 but TRIPS does not define what 
these are, and when interpreting this language, countries adopted 
                                                                                                                     
Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 
I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS]. The preambulatory language of the TRIPS agree-
ment specifically “[r]ecogniz[es] that intellectual property rights are private rights.” 
TRIPS, supra, pmbl., para. 4. 
 161. In U.S. law, a taking of private property for a public purpose is authorized under 
the Fifth Amendment and carries with it the requirement of just compensation. See U.S. 
CONST. amend. V. Partially because of this similarity, this Comment will later use U.S. 
law to analyze the TRIPS compensation requirement. 
 162. DE CARVALHO, supra note 131, at 317. 
 163. The relevant provision provides that “[m]embers may, in formulating or amending 
their laws and regulations, adopt measures necessary to protect public health and nutri-
tion, and to promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-
economic and technological development, provided that such measures are consistent with 
the provisions of this Agreement.” TRIPS, supra note 160, art. 8. 
 164. The term “compulsory licensing” is not used in the TRIPS agreement, but instead 
it is framed as “use of the subject matter of a patent without the authorization of the right 
holder.” Id. art. 31. When this provision is read in conjunction with Article 2:1, which in-
corporates Article 5.A.2 of the Paris Convention, it is understood to mean that WTO mem-
bers may grant compulsory licenses. See Frederick M. Abbott, The TRIPS-Legality of 
Measures Taken to Address Public Health Crises: A Synopsis, 7 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 71, 74 
(2001). 
 165. The reasonableness of the negotiations time period is a function of national law 
and practice. See DE CARVALHO, supra note 131, at 319. 
 166. Article 31(b) specifically provides that 
such use may only be permitted if, prior to such use, the proposed user has 
made efforts to obtain authorization from the right holder on reasonable com-
mercial terms and conditions and that such efforts have not been successful 
within a reasonable period of time. This requirement may be waived by a 
Member in the case of a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme 
urgency or in cases of public noncommercial use. In situations of national 
emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency, the right holder shall, 
nevertheless, be notified as soon as reasonably practicable. In the case of public 
non-commercial use, where the government or contractor, without making a 
patent search, knows or has demonstrable grounds to know that a valid patent 
is or will be used by or for the government, the right holder shall be informed 
promptly. 
TRIPS, supra note 160, art. 31. 
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different meanings.167 This led to subsequent international disputes, 
the most notable being the one between the United States and South 
Africa. Countries like the United States, for example, believed and 
interpreted TRIPS to bar the use of compulsory licenses to treat 
HIV/AIDS. Countries like South Africa, on the other hand, inter-
preted the agreement differently and saw compulsory licenses for the 
treatment of HIV/AIDS as fully justified within the agreement.168 
 Given these conflicting interpretations, on November 14, 2001, 
members released the Doha Declaration and clarified the TRIPS po-
sition.169 Regarding the availability of compulsory licenses under the 
agreement, members declared that not only did each member have 
the right to grant compulsory licenses, but that each member also 
had the freedom to determine the grounds upon which they are 
granted.170 Similarly, regarding the vague “national emergency” or 
“other extreme urgency” language that dispensed with the negotia-
tion provisions in Article 31, each member was granted the right to 
                                                                                                                     
 167. See Vishal Gupta, A Mathematical Approach to Benefit-Detriment Analysis as a 
Solution to Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals Under the TRIPS Agreement, 13 
CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 631, 633 (2005) (“As a result of ambiguity in the provisions, 
developing nations sought to relax the scope of intellectual property protection required 
under TRIPS while developed nations sought to choose a direction to enforce patent rights 
strongly.”). The historical background leading up the Ministerial Declaration on the TRIPS 
Agreement and Public Health in Doha on November 14, 2001 and the international dis-
putes over the scope of TRIPS further illustrate this point. See, e.g., Frederick M. Abbott, 
The Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health: Lighting a Dark Corner 
at the WTO, 5 J. INT’L ECON. L. 469, 470-72 (2002) (describing multiple international con-
flicts resulting from differing interpretations of the TRIPS provisions, specifically regard-
ing what these provisions would allow and under what circumstances). These disputes 
were sourced in the different interpretations that members of the international community 
applied to the TRIPS provisions. See id. at 480-83 (describing the various positions seg-
ments of the international community took when interpreting TRIPS and the problems 
these interpretations caused); see also id. at 493-94 (stating that misperceptions existed 
among the press and it was likely to influence how governments would respond). 
 168. By being a signatory to the TRIPS agreement and by passing its law allowing for 
compulsory licenses, South Africa’s actions testified to its belief that compulsory licenses 
were allowed. See supra notes 126-30 and accompanying text (discussing South Africa’s 
new law allowing for the use of compulsory licenses); see also Abbott, supra note 167, at 
471 (describing South Africa as a country that wanted to use TRIPS for health reform). 
When South Africa did delay implementing its law, it did so not because it believed TRIPS 
prohibited it, but because of fear that trade sanctions might follow. See Marc, supra note 
142, at 110 (“South Africa has halted implementation of the Medicine Act for fear of trade 
sanctions.”); see also Steven Lee Myers, South Africa and U.S. End Dispute over Drugs, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1999, at A8 (summarizing that the United States felt the law was too 
broad under then-existing trade laws but that it would halt trade sanctions in exchange for 
South Africa’s agreement to adopt stricter standards). 
 169. The Doha Declaration has been declared a victory for both health activists and the 
pharmaceutical industry. See Kevin Gopal, New Accord, PHARMACEUTICAL EXECUTIVE, 
Jan. 2002, at 28. 
 170. Paragraph 5(b) of the Declaration specifically provides that “[e]ach Member has 
the right to grant compulsory licences and the freedom to determine the grounds upon 
which such licences are granted.” World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 
November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002) [hereinafter Doha Declaration 
on Public Health]. 
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determine what constitutes such an emergency and it was recognized 
that epidemics such as HIV/AIDS can represent one.171 In doing so, it 
was laid to rest whether or not TRIPS would allow compulsory li-
censes to treat diseases like HIV/AIDS. But, one issue still remains. 
If TRIPS is “to reduce the distortions and impediments to interna-
tional trade,” and if compulsory licenses are a source of such distor-
tions, then how should TRIPS step in when a compulsory license  
is issued? 
IV.   BALANCING TRADE AND PRESERVING INNOVATION: DETERMINING 
“ADEQUATE REMUNERATION” 
 After Doha, it was clear that a TRIPS member could battle 
HIV/AIDS and similar health epidemics with compulsory licenses, 
but it was not clear what obligations would follow from that decision. 
In the agreement’s general terms, these obligations are two-fold. 
First, each member, bound by the purpose of the agreement, has the 
obligation “to reduce distortions and impediments to international 
trade.”172 Second, each member has the obligation to promote tech-
nological innovation or at least not to hinder it.173 When a member is-
sues a compulsory license, these general obligations are met in the 
one entitlement that the patent holder retains—that of due compen-
sation174 or, as TRIPS provides, “adequate remuneration.”175 
 But “adequate remuneration” is a vague term open to multiple in-
terpretations, and the uncertainty surrounding it has led some coun-
tries to issue or threaten to issue compulsory licenses to bolster do-
mestic industry rather than domestic health,176 a practice that dis-
torts trade, shifts costs, and shackles ongoing innovation efforts.177 In 
response, developed countries, fearing that inadequate compensation 
will result from the licensing decision, have no incentive to allow the 
license to issue and have every incentive to erect trade barriers that 
preserve their IP advantages and protect their domestic innovators. 
Using such barriers can block compulsory licenses in those countries 
                                                                                                                     
 171. Paragraph 5(c) of the Declaration provides that “[e]ach Member has the right to 
determine what constitutes a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme ur-
gency, it being understood that public health crises, including those relating to HIV/AIDS, 
tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics, can represent a national emergency or other 
circumstances of extreme urgency.” Id. para. 5(c). 
 172. TRIPS, supra note 160, annex 1C, pmbl., para. 1. 
 173. Id. art. 7 (providing that “[t]he protection and enforcement of intellectual property 
rights should contribute to the promotion of technological innovation”). 
 174. See DE CARVALHO, supra note 131, at 37-39. 
 175. See TRIPS, supra note 160, art. 31(h) (providing that “the right holder shall be 
paid adequate remuneration in the circumstances of each case, taking into account the eco-
nomic value of the authorization” (emphasis added)). 
 176. See A Gathering Storm, supra note 1. 
 177. See supra Part II.A.2. (discussing how pharmaceutical innovation efforts are 
funded with current revenue); Part II.B.2. (discussing how compulsory licenses distort trade). 
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that need them most, and this practice threatens to make Doha 
meaningless. In addition, without assurances of adequate compensa-
tion, the pharmaceutical industry could likely turn away from re-
searching drugs essential to the developing world, making a dire sit-
uation worse.178 
 Therefore, to preserve the original purposes of TRIPS and Doha, a 
member’s obligation to pay “adequate remuneration” must be clari-
fied, and the remainder of this Comment will do just that. Specifical-
ly, to avoid the unnecessary consequences above, it will interpret 
“adequate remuneration” in a way that discourages countries from 
using compulsory licenses to gain an international advantage while 
ensuring others that the resulting compensation will be fair. In doing 
so, it will outline principles for TRIPS compliance, eliminate non-
compliant alternatives, and establish a framework of trade-offs and 
considerations that a court or other government body can use when 
calculating “adequate remuneration” so that innovation will be pre-
served, trade balanced, and access enabled. 
A.   TRIPS Compliance Principles 
 To ensure that any resulting interpretation of “adequate remune-
ration” is consistent with TRIPS, it is necessary to establish some 
baseline principles to guide the analysis. Such principles must flow 
from the document itself and from the agreements of its signato-
ries.179 Therefore, when interpreting “adequate remuneration,” the 
analysis begins with the Ministerial Conference’s subsequent decla-
rations and continues with analyzing them in light of individual 
TRIPS requirements. This is because “adequate remuneration,” like 
the “national emergency” language, is an example of a TRIPS provi-
sion left deliberately vague on account of the differing interests and 
positions at stake amongst the parties to the agreement. These vague 
provisions were included as a compromise, and their meanings are 
found in future clarification from decisions of the Dispute Settlement 
Body or from subsequent negotiations and agreements of the Minis-
terial Conference.180 Accordingly, after looking at the Ministerial Dec-
laration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health from November 
14, 2001,181 two principles are discernable. 
                                                                                                                     
 178. See A Gathering Storm, supra note 1 (summarizing a pharmaceutical chief’s view 
that compulsory licensing could deter the drug industry from researching diseases found in 
the impoverished areas of the world). But see Whalen, supra note 111 (reporting that 
GlaxoSmithKline PLC is increasing its efforts to combat disease in poor countries by 
reducing prices and focusing research in neglected areas). 
 179. See DE CARVALHO, supra note 131, at 31. 
 180. See id. 
 181. See Doha Declaration on Public Health, supra note 170. 
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 The first principle is that compulsory licenses should not be seen 
as a “silver bullet” to the world’s health crises, but should instead be 
part of a larger and more comprehensive international solution.182 To 
preserve this principle, “adequate remuneration” must encompass 
some limitation that would prevent the broad use of compulsory li-
censes. In other words, “adequate remuneration” cannot be inter-
preted as a bright-line rule or compensation scheme because if it 
was, then it would undermine this end. It also would not comply with 
Article 31(b)’s preference for negotiation with the patent holder be-
cause the certainty of a bright-line rule could encourage broad decla-
rations of “national emergenc[ies] or other circumstances of extreme 
urgency” that would dispense with this requirement.183 
 This is because the certainty afforded by a bright-line rule enables 
parties to calculate their legal liabilities a priori, and when a party 
believes a future legal remedy will be more beneficial than what can 
otherwise be negotiated in a private transaction, that party is likely 
to forego the private transaction in favor of the legal remedy.184 In 
the context of TRIPS, this means that if a member estimates its 
“adequate remuneration” liability and finds it to be more favorable 
than what could be negotiated, then that member has an incentive to 
exploit the freedom that Doha recognizes185 and declare a circums-
tance of extreme urgency rather than negotiate with the patent hold-
er.186 Similarly, when the patent holder feels favored by the legal re-
medy, there is the same incentive to refuse commercially reasonable 
terms.187 In both instances, Article 31(b)’s preference for negotia- 
                                                                                                                     
 182. Id. para. 2 (providing that TRIPS can only “be part of the wider national and in-
ternational action to address these [public health] problems”). 
 183. TRIPS, supra note 160, at 31. 
 184. This is the reverse proposition of economic theory’s efficient breach of contract. 
Under that theory, the bright-line rule of expectation damages allows parties to calculate, 
with reasonable certainty, their liabilities for breach of contract prior to breach. When a 
breach of contract is efficient (that is when the legal remedy for breach is more favorable 
than the costs associated with completing the contract), a party will forego the private, 
contractual obligation in favor of the legal remedy. See, e.g., Lake River Corp. v. Carborun-
dum Co., 769 F.2d 1284, 1289 (7th Cir. 1985) (discussing the economic theory of efficient 
breach in the context of penalty clauses). Here, it is necessary to avoid the bright-line rule 
in order to avoid incentives to disregard preferences for negotiation and private transac-
tions in favor of more beneficial legal remedies. 
 185. See supra notes 170-71 and accompanying text. 
 186. This is disfavored because of the preference for larger international cooperation 
with regard to battling public health crises rather than relying on compulsory licenses to 
be a “silver bullet.” See supra note 182 and accompanying text. 
 187. Encouraging patentees to avoid negotiations would undermine the real value of 
the compulsory license, which is the inducement of the patentee to agree to reasonable 
terms. See Julian-Arnold, supra note 13, at 364 (suggesting that the reason few compul-
sory licenses are issued is because of their dormant power to urge successful negotiations); 
see also STEPHEN P. LADAS, PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND RELATED RIGHTS—NATIONAL AND 
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 427, § 248 (1975) (stating that “[t]he practical value . . . of 
compulsory license provisions . . . [is that they] usually induce[] the grant of contractual li-
censes on reasonable terms”). 
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tion is undermined, but when the member dispenses with negotia-
tion, the broad use of compulsory licenses is encouraged. Therefore, a 
bright-line rule would be contrary to the Declaration188 and inconsis-
tent with the TRIPS mandate189 because it would encourage parties 
to ignore procedural requirements in favor of expedience or other 
tangible benefit. 
 The second principle is that “adequate remuneration” cannot de-
feat the object and purpose of the agreement190 by undermining tech-
nological innovation or by harming the public welfare.191 This means 
that “adequate remuneration” must account for balancing access to 
essential medicines with the incentives to innovate them for tomor-
row.192 Consequently, any calculation that does not consider both 
perspectives will be inadequate. 
B.   What Is Not “Adequate Remuneration” 
 Applying these guiding principles in light of the TRIPS obligations 
eliminates two interpretations of “adequate remuneration” and es-
tablishes a promising compensation approach. 
 The first interpretation bases “adequate remuneration” on a lost 
profits standard as determined by full market value. This interpreta-
tion is inadequate because it defeats the very purpose of the compul-
sory license within the TRIPS regime. Given that a compulsory li-
cense should promote the public health through lower medicine 
costs,193 when royalties are based upon lost profits, no subsequent 
                                                                                                                     
 188. See supra note 182 and accompanying text. 
 189. See TRIPS, supra note 160, pmbl., para. 1 (stating that a desire of the members 
was “to reduce distortions and impediments to international trade”); see also supra notes 
134-35 and accompanying text (discussing how compulsory licenses introduce international 
trade distortions). 
 190. Doha Declaration on Public Health, supra note 170, para. 5(a) (providing that “[i]n 
applying the customary rules of interpretation of public international law, each provision 
of the TRIPS Agreement shall be read in the light of the object and purpose of the Agree-
ment as expressed, in particular, in its objectives and principles.”). 
 191. Article 7 contains the objectives of TRIPS and reads as follows:  
The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should contri-
bute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and dis-
semination of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users of 
technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic wel-
fare, and to a balance of rights and obligations. 
See TRIPS, supra note 160, art. 7. 
 192. This follows from the requirement that IP rights be enforced “to promote technol-
ogical innovation . . . in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a bal-
ance of rights and obligations.” Id. Defining “adequate remuneration” in any other way 
that does not reflect the interests of both sides would essentially be the same as ignoring 
them and would thereby defeat the objective of the agreement as defined in Article 7. 
 193. See supra notes 160-64 and accompanying text. 
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price reduction follows.194 This means that access to essential medi-
cines does not increase, and when the “adequate remuneration” cal-
culation does not account for access, it is inconsistent with the second 
principle above.195 Therefore, interpreting “adequate remuneration” 
as lost profits is inappropriate. 
 The second interpretation defines “adequate remuneration” as “no 
compensation.” Like lost profits, “no compensation” is contrary to the 
second principle above because, although such a substantial decrease 
in costs increases access, it does not do so “to the mutual advantage 
of producers and users of technological knowledge” and is not “in a 
manner conducive . . . to a balance of rights and obligations.”196 This 
is because “no compensation” means no reimbursement for the neces-
sary investment expended in developing the technology, which does 
not advantage the innovator. It also is not conducive to balancing 
rights and obligations because it does not account for the IP right, 
which, as a recognized private property right,197 requires compensa-
tion.198 Moreover, a “no compensation” scheme ignores the “silver bul-
let” principle because rather than deter the broad use of compulsory 
licenses, it encourages it,199 which as previously described, distorts 
international trade.200 
 Instead, to be consistent with both the guiding principles and the 
TRIPS obligations, a proper approach calculates “adequate remune-
ration” in a way that reflects both perspectives of the compulsory li-
censing dilemma201 and balances them through individual trade-
offs.202 Such a calculation, though complex, preserves the preference 
                                                                                                                     
 194. See F.M. Scherer & Jayashree Watal, Post-TRIPS Options for Access to Patented 
Medicines in Developing Nations, 5 J. INT’L ECON. L. 913, 921 (2002); see also SCHERER, su-
pra note 64, at 35 (describing that the financial effect of setting royalties at full market 
value is the same as exclusive exploitation of the patent by the patentee). 
 195. TRIPS requires that “adequate remuneration” account for balancing access to es-
sential medicines with the incentives to innovate them for tomorrow. Therefore, both must 
be reflected in the calculation. See supra note 192 and accompanying text. 
 196. TRIPS, supra note 160, art. 7. But see Vaughan, supra note 152, at 108 (conclud-
ing that based on U.S. precedent and on the inability of developing countries to pay mono-
poly prices for pharmaceuticals, patent holders for pharmaceuticals in developing nations 
are not entitled to any compensation when that country issues a compulsory license). 
 197. See TRIPS, supra note 160. 
 198. See DE CARVALHO, supra note 131, at 37-39 (arguing that IP, like private proper-
ty, requires due compensation when confiscated by the government). 
 199. Since the first guiding principle disfavors certainty in a priori liability  
calculations, “no compensation,” which means there is no liability, will certainly under-
mine this principle. 
 200. If inadequate compensation is likely to lead to distortions in international trade, 
then “no compensation” will only exacerbate those distortions and be contrary to the very 
mandate of TRIPS. See supra notes 134-35 and accompanying text. 
 201. This would make it compliant with the second guiding principle. See supra note 
192 and accompanying text. 
 202. But see JAMES LOVE, REMUNERATION GUIDELINES FOR NON-VOLUNTARY USE OF A 
PATENT ON MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES 6-7, WHO/TCM/2005.1 (2005), available at 
http://www.who.int/medicines/areas/technical_cooperation/WHOTCM2005.1_OMS.pdf (ad-
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for negotiation by undermining the certainty of a priori calcula-
tions203 and, in addition to balancing the interests of both sides, can 
account for other TRIPS requirements. 
 One such requirement is the requirement that “adequate remune-
ration” account for the economic value of the authorization,204  
particularly in a way that balances incentives for innovation with 
access to medicines.205 The complexity of this requirement dictates 
that neither a single compensation standard nor a bright-line rule 
will be sufficient, but that multiple considerations should be made.  
Similarly, TRIPS requires that the basis for a compulsory license be 
its individual merits.206 By considering both sides and selecting op-
tions that balance their interests, a court can tailor a license’s com-
pensation to the most relevant facts and thereby base it on its indi-
vidual merits.  
C.   Calculating “Adequate Remuneration” 
 Based on the above, if a court is to calculate “adequate remunera-
tion” as a balance of perspectives and as a tailored selection of mul-
tiple options, then it must know the parts of “adequate remunera-
tion,” what the options are, and how to consider them within the 
proper framework so that a balance can be struck. The analysis be-
low presents these criteria after filtering them from the precedents of 
developed countries, and it uses these precedents on the basis of two 
theories. One is the theory that compensation schemes in these coun-
tries are best at calculating payments so that innovation is not 
stifled.207 Another is the theory that a country will be less likely to 
respond to a compulsory license with trade sanctions when its own 
                                                                                                                     
vocating a simple system to ensure ease of administration, transparency, and predictabili-
ty for governments with limited capacity to administer a complex, multifactored approach, 
but advocating a complex, multifactored approach for countries with the resources neces-
sary to make such administrative determinations); Mark C. Lang, What a Long, Strange 
“TRIPS” It’s Been: Compulsory Licensing from the Adoption of TRIPS to the Agreement on 
Implementation of the DOHA Declaration, 3 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. 331, 352 
(2004) (advocating a bright-line, minimal royalty rate justified on the certainty principle). 
 203. The complexity of the calculation undermines the certainty here, and it would 
make it compliant with the first guiding principle—the “silver bullet” principle. See supra 
note 182 and accompanying text. 
 204. See TRIPS, supra note 160, art. 31(h) (“[T]he right holder shall be paid adequate 
remuneration in the circumstances of each case, taking into account the economic value of 
the authorization.” (emphasis added)). 
 205. See supra notes 190-92 and accompanying text. 
 206. See TRIPS, supra note 160, art. 31(a) (requiring that “authorization of such use 
shall be considered on its individual merits”). 
 207. Some may say this assertion is dubious at best because developed countries could 
very well be best at preserving innovation because of their reluctance to issue compulsory 
licenses and not because their compensation schemes are better than those elsewhere in 
the world. See supra Part II.A.1 (discussing the rarity of compulsory licenses in the United 
States). Even if this is the case, one should recognize that this is only a starting point and 
not the end of the analysis. 
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precedents are used to compensate the patent holder,208 thus avoid-
ing an impediment to trade.209 
 Relying on these two theories, eminent domain law from the Unit-
ed States has been chosen as the foundation of this analysis. Specifi-
cally, this analysis relies on 28 U.S.C. § 1498,210 because like an exer-
cise of eminent domain, a compulsory license must serve a public 
purpose and must duly compensate the patentee.211 Informing the 
analysis are practices from the United Kingdom and Canada, where 
experiences with pharmaceuticals and compulsory licenses have been 
the most thorough.212 
 Excluded from the analysis, though, are compensation schemes 
that serve as antitrust remedies because these schemes aim to cor-
rect anticompetitive practice, not preserve innovation.213 Moreover, 
antitrust remedies fall outside the “adequate remuneration” re-
quirement of TRIPS and therefore remain a separate consideration.214 
1.   “Adequate Remuneration” Framework 
 Before presenting various options for determining “adequate re-
muneration” and outlining a method for making individual trade-
offs, a framework must be established so these options can be placed 
                                                                                                                     
 208. For example, if the United States is likely to impose trade sanctions when a com-
pulsory license is used, it may be less likely to do so if the patentee receives compensation 
in accordance with U.S. law because then the issuing country’s IP protection would more 
closely match that of the United States. See supra notes 136-42 and accompanying text 
(discussing how the United States imposes trade sanctions against those countries whose 
IP protection is weaker than is expected). 
 209. Any compensation method that claims to be TRIPS-compliant must avoid impe-
diments to trade. See TRIPS, supra note 160, pmbl., para. 1. 
 210. 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) provides that 
[w]henever an invention described in and covered by a patent of the United 
States is used or manufactured by or for the United States without license of 
the owner thereof or lawful right to use or manufacture the same, the owner’s 
remedy shall be by action against the United States in the United States Court 
of Federal Claims for the recovery of his reasonable and entire compensation 
for such use and manufacture. 
28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (2000); see also Leesona Corp. v. United States, 599 F.2d 958, 964 (Ct. 
Cl. 1979) (“When the government has infringed, it is deemed to have ‘taken’ the patent li-
cense under an eminent domain theory, and compensation is the just compensation re-
quired by the fifth amendment.”). 
 211. See supra notes 162, 198 and accompanying text. 
 212. See generally David J. Henry, Multi-National Practice in Determining Provisions 
in Compulsory Patent Licenses, 11 J. INT’L L. & ECON. 325 (1977) (comparing multinational 
practices in compulsory licensing and focusing specifically on practices from Canada and 
the United Kingdom because of their multiple decisions in the area and their focus on the 
terms of individual licenses). 
 213. See supra notes 190-92 and accompanying text (discussing how innovation is es-
sential to the calculation). 
 214. See TRIPS, supra note 160, art. 31(k) (providing that “[m]embers are not obliged to 
apply the conditions set forth in subparagraphs (b) and (f) where such use is permitted to re-
medy a practice determined after judicial or administrative process to be anti-competitive”). 
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in the proper context. This framework includes defining the compo-
nent parts of “adequate remuneration” and identifying the steps ne-
cessary for determining “adequate remuneration” so that it will be 
TRIPS compliant. 
 Because U.S. eminent domain law is the foundation of this analy-
sis, “adequate remuneration” is defined as a two-part royalty—one 
part a compensation base and the other part a royalty rate that ap-
plies to that base.215 Fortunately, this coincides well with British and 
Canadian practices, which similarly define royalties.216 
 To ensure TRIPS compliance, a series of steps are needed so that 
a court can methodically make its calculation in accordance with the 
agreement. To meet this end, it is necessary to recall that TRIPS re-
quires any royalty given in exchange for a compulsory license be 
based upon its “economic value”217 as calculated from a perspective 
that balances assurances of future technological innovation with the 
right to access essential medicines.218 This requires a court to analyze 
“economic value” from the perspective of both the patent holder and 
the issuing government, with an eye toward balancing an incentive 
to innovate for the former and a desire to access for the latter.219 
 This is a complex arrangement, but various options for both the 
compensation base and the royalty rate are available and presented 
below to meet this end. Therefore, to make sure that the royalty pre-
serves innovation, the first step in the calculation requires a court to 
calculate the royalty in a way that ensures innovation does not suf-
fer. The second step in the calculation requires a court to choose in-
dividual options that will decrease the royalty’s total value in light of 
the issuing country’s capacity to pay. By doing so, a court ensures 
that access is maintained and that the purpose of the compulsory li-
cense is not defeated. Although this may result in a royalty that is 
                                                                                                                     
 215. See ITT Corp. v. United States, 17 Cl. Ct. 199, 202 (1989) (“One approach . . . [is] 
to determine an applicable compensation base and to apply a reasonable royalty rate to 
this figure.”). 
 216. In the United States, there is also an additional compensation element of “delay 
compensation” that is meant “to accomplish complete justice as between the plaintiff and 
the United States.” Waite v. United States, 282 U.S. 508, 509 (1931). This element is not 
found in the compensation schemes of the United Kingdom and Canada when applied to 
pharmaceuticals, no doubt because these countries did not seize the technology but only 
dictated the terms for its license. This points out a resulting discontinuity of starting with 
28 U.S.C. § 1498, and to avoid it, this Comment does not discuss or include it. It seems 
reasonable, however, that if an issuing country includes “delay compensation” in its emi-
nent domain compensation calculation or seizes the pharmaceutical for state distribution, 
then this component can be included as well. 
 217. See TRIPS, supra note 160, art. 31(h) (“[T]he right holder shall be paid adequate 
remuneration in the circumstances of each case, taking into account the economic value of 
the authorization.” (emphasis added)). 
 218. This is merely a restatement of the second principle described earlier. See supra 
notes 190-92 and accompanying text. 
 219. See supra note 192 and accompanying text. 
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not ideal from an innovation perspective, it is necessary to account 
for both perspectives.220 
 Therefore, “adequate remuneration” consists of two parts—a com-
pensation base and a royalty rate that applies to that base. For both 
parts, various options exist for a court to consider, and a court should 
begin by determining a compensation base and royalty rate that is 
innovation-centric. Next, in light of the country’s capacity to pay, it 
should consider other options for the royalty’s parts and make indi-
vidual trade-offs that afford access. 
 Finally, to ensure TRIPS compliance, a validation step is neces-
sary to judge the royalty’s reasonableness in light of the innovation 
and access restraints.221 Only by validating the royalty with some ob-
jective measure can a court ensure the proper balance has been 
struck. For this reason, the final step in the calculation is a valida-
tion step that requires a court to evaluate the reasonableness of its 
“adequate remuneration” determination. 
2.   Determining a Royalty Rate 
 If the basis for a compulsory license is its individual merits,222 
then when considering the proper royalty rate, a court must first 
consider the surrounding facts. In doing so, the court can initially de-
termine whether or not defining “adequate remuneration” according 
to the scheme proposed above is overly complex. That is, in some sit-
uations, the facts may dictate that an easier method for compensat-
ing the patent holder is available. And when available, a court can 
embrace it, conserving precious judicial resources in the process. 
Should the court decide otherwise, then as the first step in determin-
                                                                                                                     
 220. Note that innovation is not a function of one country’s royalty but is a function of 
the compensation system’s ability to control costs. Here, the proposed framework attempts 
to calculate an “ideal” royalty that reflects the cost of innovation and then brings it into 
harmony with an individual country’s access abilities to make it “fair.” Therefore, consum-
ers benefit from lower costs and any resulting harms to innovation are contained. See John 
H. Barton, The Economics of TRIPS: International Trade in Information-Intensive Prod-
ucts, 33 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 473, 489-90 (2001) (discussing that under TRIPS, forms 
of international IP protection must provide long-term benefits to innovation that outweigh 
the costs to the world’s consumers and that the global allocation of innovation costs should 
be fair). 
 221. This practice also is derived from U.S. law. See Leesona Corp. v. United States, 
599 F.2d 958, 973 (Ct. Cl. 1979) (stating that “one way to monitor the reasonableness of 
our determination of just compensation is to compute the award by estimating a reasona-
ble royalty on a proper compensation base, and then test this award by an examination of 
other available measures”). 
 222. See supra note 206 and accompanying text (discussing the “individual  
merits” requirement). 
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ing the proper compensation base and royalty rate, the court can cal-
culate the “economic value” of the license.223 
 Under U.S. law, when valuating a compulsory license, a court 
looks to the surrounding facts, particularly the terms of the license 
such as its scope and duration.224 Since TRIPS requires that “the 
scope and duration of . . . [the license] be limited to the purpose for 
which it was authorized,” then depending on the purpose, some li-
censes may be very short.225 In these instances, rather than establish 
a two-part royalty, a court may simply lengthen the patent term, 
similar to what is done in the United States under the Hatch-
Waxman Act.226 Passed in response to previous legislation allowing 
generic manufacturers to intrude upon patents for the sake of regu-
latory approval,227 this Act seeks to remedy the harm to the patent 
holder that results from a temporary intrusion by preserving the ef-
fective life of the patent.228 
 This approach could very well be the best for a court because it 
partially avoids the valuation problem, but unfortunately, it will like-
ly be inappropriate for most pharmaceutical cases.229 When dealing 
with health crises like HIV/AIDS that require long-term treatment or 
when a short-term intrusion on the patent will result in a much low-
er probability that the innovator will recover the associated costs 
                                                                                                                     
 223. As will be shown, both sides must be accounted for because it is the only way that 
a license can balance incentives for innovation with the need to access essential medicines. 
See supra note 192 and accompanying text. 
 224. See Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 
(S.D.N.Y. 1970). Although royalty determinations often cite Georgia-Pacific, a court should 
distinguish it because it was decided under 35 U.S.C. § 284. Although there are a number 
of overlapping factors when calculating compensation rates based on 28 U.S.C. § 1498 and 
35 U.S.C. § 284, infringements under the former are thought of as an “ ‘eminent domain 
taking of a patent license,’ ” not a tort claim like infringements under the latter. See ITT 
Corp. v. United States, 17 Cl. Ct. 199, 202 (1989). 
 225. See TRIPS, supra note 160, art. 31(c) (providing that “the scope and duration of 
such use shall be limited to the purpose for which it was authorized, and in the case of 
semi-conductor technology shall only be for public non-commercial use or to remedy a prac-
tice determined after judicial or administrative process to be anti-competitive”). 
 226. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration (Hatch-Waxman) Act, Pub. 
L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 21, 28, 
and 35 U.S.C.). 
 227. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) provides that 
[i]t shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to sell, or sell within 
the United States or import into the United States a patented invention . . . 
solely for uses reasonably related to the development and submission of infor-
mation under a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of 
drugs or veterinary biological products. 
35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000). 
 228. See 35 U.S.C. § 156(c) (2000) (allowing for an extension of patents that are  
subject to regulatory review for a period that is no greater than the period required to  
obtain approval). 
 229. See supra note 45 and accompanying text (discussing how the valuation problem 
leads courts to issue injunctions as remedies). 
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over time,230 simply lengthening the patent term will be ineffective 
because, in both cases, the patent holder’s opportunity to recover 
costs and reinvest them for development is lost.231 
 If this is the case, then a court should opt for the royalty-based 
compensation scheme and begin its analysis by determining the 
“economic value” of the license to the patent holder.232 This can be 
done in two ways under U.S. law. One way uses the comparative 
royalty technique, and the other compensates the patent holder by 
valuating what was lost. 
 Under the comparative royalty technique, a court analyzes the 
remainder of the license’s terms and compares them with similar li-
censes.233 If similar licenses are found and indicate an already estab-
lished royalty, then the court adopts that royalty.234 If no similar li-
censes and established royalties are found, then the other option un-
der U.S. law is to valuate what the patent holder has lost.235 In this 
respect, since the “economic value” determination must preserve the 
incentive to innovate,236 a suitable royalty rate should account for in-
novation and its attendant innovation variables—the costs of innova-
tion and invention, the risks, the potential payoffs that accompany 
success, and the rate of competitive imitation.237 
 Hence, when defining a royalty in terms of what the innovator has 
lost, the first variable—the cost of innovation and invention—is 
simply an accounting for the costs to develop the drug as well as to 
                                                                                                                     
 230. No specific examples are apparent to the author at this time, but one can imagine 
the case of a specialty drug specifically engineered to combat a sudden pandemic. If the 
probability of this pandemic is relatively low, so that it can only be expected to occur once 
during the patent’s term, then an intrusion on the patent without sufficient compensation 
during this period would have a harmful effect since for the remainder of the patent term, 
the demand will be significantly lower. As a result, if denied compensation when demand 
is highest, the likelihood of recovering the development costs will be much lower. 
 231. See supra note 90 and accompanying text (discussing how innovation in the 
pharmaceutical industry sprouts from a company’s ability to recover costs through sales of 
patented products). 
 232. See supra notes 217-19 and accompanying text (discussing why “economic value” 
must be determined from both the patent holder’s and issuing country’s perspectives). 
 233 See Leesona Corp. v. United States, 599 F.2d 958, 973 (Ct. Cl. 1979) (discussing 
the comparative royalty technique for defining royalties and stating that “[t]he compara-
tive royalty technique is the preferred method of determining just compensation”). 
 234. Tektronix, Inc. v. United States, 552 F.2d 343, 347 (Ct. Cl. 1977) (stating that 
when “an established royalty rate for the patented inventions is shown to exist, that rate 
will usually be adopted as the best measure of reasonable and entire compensation”); see, 
e.g., ITT Corp. v. United States, 17 Cl. Ct. 199, 223-40 (1989) (using a comparison of simi-
lar licenses to provide a basis for determining just compensation). 
 235. See Leesona, 599 F.2d at 969, 972, 977 (describing the value to the patentee as a 
basis for compensation, stating that “[t]he proper measure in eminent domain is what the 
owner has lost” and stating further that “[t]he just compensation to which an owner is en-
titled when his property is taken by eminent domain is regarded . . . from the point of view 
of the owner of the right and not from that of the taker”). 
 236. See supra notes 217-19 and accompanying text. 
 237. See supra Part II.A.2. 
2009]                         SAVING TOMORROW FROM TODAY 309 
 
bring it to market.238 These costs are particularly relevant because 
they are the costs that any potential licensee will be “free-riding” 
upon,239 and precedent for reimbursing them is found in the United 
Kingdom under Section 41 of its Patents Act of 1949. Under this Act, 
courts aimed to provide a “reasonable advantage” to the patent holder 
while also finding the lowest possible prices for drugs.240 This “reason-
able advantage” came in the form of a multielement royalty rate with 
one element accounting for the drug’s research and marketing costs.241 
 Beginning with research costs, the British courts gave compensa-
tion according to the industrial practice for funding research.242 Conse-
quently, since the pharmaceutical industry funds current research out 
of current sales,243 the first royalty percentage element should be a 
percentage defined as the ratio of total research expenses to world 
sales, as defined by the patent holder’s balance sheet.244 The basis for 
this ratio can either be the world sales of all products, which is more 
favorable to an issuing country, or the world sales of all research-
developed products, which is friendlier to the patent holder.245 In ei-
ther case, this royalty element is both simple to calculate and adminis-
ter in comparison to a more exacting alternative that would determine 
how much a particular drug’s profits fund total research efforts.246 
 The next cost category is marketing costs, or promotion costs, and 
once again, British practice provides a model. Justified on the theory 
that promotion costs are part of the benefit that a licensee receives 
from the promotion of the drug by the patent holder,247 the British 
                                                                                                                     
 238. One could also argue that a royalty should include attorneys’ fees as well since 
these are costs employed in obtaining an “adequate remuneration” that preserves innova-
tion incentives. Attorneys’ fees, however, are specifically excluded in U.S. law and thus this 
Comment does not include them. Traditionally, under 28 U.S.C. § 1498, attorneys’ fees 
have not been awarded except in a limited number of statutory exceptions contained there-
in. Since the traditional view is that attorneys’ fees are a punitive award, U.S. courts have 
declined to include them when determining just compensation after the government takes 
a patent. See Leesona, 599 F.2d at 970; see also Dohaney v. Rogers, 281 U.S. 362, 368 
(1930) (holding that the just compensation award that follows an eminent domain taking 
does not include attorneys’ fees). 
 239. See supra notes 72-80 and accompanying text. 
 240. “In settling the terms of licenses under the section the Comptroller shall endea-
vour to secure that food, medicines, and surgical and curative devices shall be available to 
the public at the lowest prices consistent with the patentees deriving a reasonable advan-
tage from their patent rights.” J.R. Geigy S.A.’s Patent, [1964] R.P.C. 391, 398 (U.K.) (cit-
ing section 41(2) of the Patents Act of 1949); see also Henry, supra note 212, at 329. 
 241. See J.R. Geigy, [1964] R.P.C. at 398. 
 242. See Henry, supra note 212, at 331 (noting that British courts adopted this indus-
trial practice when determining the research element of a royalty). 
 243. See supra note 90 and accompanying text. 
 244. See F. Hoffman-La Roche & Co. A.G.’s Patent, [1973] R.P.C. 601, 606 (U.K.). 
 245. Friendliness to either party is a function of the divisor in the ratio. A constant div-
idend divided by a larger divisor results in a smaller percentage and thus favors the is-
suing country. A smaller divisor would likewise favor the patent holder. 
 246. See F. Hoffman-La Roche, [1973] R.P.C. at 607. 
 247. J.R. Geigy S.A.’s Patent, [1964] R.P.C. 391, 400 (U.K.). 
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courts apportioned the patent holder’s marketing expenditures 
across a number of categories—such as clinical trials, advertising ex-
penses, marketing activity, and administrative costs—and included 
them as elements within the royalty rate.248 Such a scheme in the in-
ternational context would necessarily be case-specific and would re-
quire a court to make individualized findings. These findings would 
reflect the promotion funds expended and expected to be lost as a re-
sult of the license, and a court reimbursing costs based on these find-
ings should use British practices as a guide.249 
 When compensating for risk, the second innovation variable, there 
are two approaches. The first compensates directly for risk by ac-
counting for failures and successes. The second compensates through 
an arbitrary profit element added to the royalty rate. The British 
courts used both. 
 For example, when calculating the research element of the royalty 
percentage, British courts accounted for all funded research activity. 
Believing this to be “the only realistic method of recovering research 
costs,”250 the courts determined a royalty rate that compensated for 
both successes and failures that occur in the research process and 
thereby accounted for risk.251 
 A court wishing to account for risk in the royalty rate could easily 
adopt this model, but should it fall short, the court could continue to 
follow the British model and add an arbitrary profit element to the 
royalty rate.252 Based on prior practices, this profit element some-
times reached as high as 22.5% of those costs incurred for research 
and promotion.253 
 At first glance, such a high profit element may be difficult to justi-
fy solely as a matter of risk. But risk is only part of the innovation 
picture. When the detrimental effects that a compulsory license has 
on innovation are also considered, such a high profit element is easi-
er to accept. In other words, using such a high profit element may on-
ly be justifiable after remembering that the compulsory license nulli-
fies two of the four innovation variables. Specifically, when the li-
cense is issued, there is no longer any barrier to competitive imita-
tion,254 and as that competition enters the market, the patent’s poten-
                                                                                                                     
 248. Henry, supra note 212, at 332. 
 249. See, e.g., F. Hoffman-La Roche, [1973] R.P.C. at 612 (summarizing how promotion 
costs were apportioned). 
 250. J.R. Geigy, [1964] R.P.C. at 400. 
 251. See Henry, supra note 212, at 341. 
 252. See, e.g., F. Hoffman-La Roche, [1973] R.P.C. at 617. 
 253. See Henry, supra note 212, at 330 n.17. 
 254. See supra notes 72-87 and accompanying text (discussing why, in the pharmaceut-
ical context, patents are the most effective barrier to competitive imitation). 
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tial reward is diminished.255 Therefore, this additional profit element 
in the royalty rate is justified not only because of risk, but also be-
cause of the entry of competition and the erosion in expected profits 
for the patent holder.256 
 Furthermore, because the loss of expected profits is relevant to 
the profit element, a court should also consider the particular charac-
teristics of the licensed drug.257 That is, a court should assess wheth-
er the drug can be described as a “blockbuster” drug because “block-
buster” drugs fund the majority of research and development activi-
ties.258 If the drug is a “blockbuster,” then it weighs in favor of a 
higher profit element. 
 In sum, to compensate for innovation when no comparable royalty 
exists and when lengthening the patent term is insufficient, a court 
should rely on a royalty rate that consists of the sum of three ele-
ments—a research element consisting of a ratio of research and de-
velopment costs to sales, a promotions costs element defined accord-
ing to an individual apportionment of expenses, and a profit element. 
 This is not the end of the calculation, however, because as pre-
viously described, “adequate remuneration” must account for access, 
and the final compensation must reflect this.259 Therefore, if the  
royalty rate does not afford access, a court must decrease it until it 
reaches a balance between access and innovation. In the context  
of the above analysis, some of the options presented would lessen the 
total royalty, but assuming this is not enough, other options  
are available. 
 These options exist under Section 41 of the Canadian Patent Act 
of 1969 where compensation was primarily a function of “the value of 
the use . . . to the licensee,”260 but because they do not fold well into 
the previously described innovation variables, they should not be re-
                                                                                                                     
 255. See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text (discussing the patent’s effect on re-
covering costs). 
 256. See, e.g., F. Hoffman-La Roche, [1973] R.P.C. at 608 (noting that the profit ele-
ment reflects the monopoly situation the patent provided prior to the license). This is not 
the end of the inquiry when considering expected profits. See infra Part IV.C.4 (describing 
how expected profits should be used to validate the royalty). 
 257. See, e.g., Charles Pfizer & Co. v. Novopharm Ltd., [1970] 65 C.P.R. 132, 142-43 
(Can.) (considering the importance of the drug Terramycin when evaluating the appro-
priateness of the royalty). 
 258. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 14, ch. 3, at 5 (noting that brand-name com-
panies heavily rely on a small number of “ ‘blockbuster’ ” drugs to recoup their innovation 
investments, including those made for failed products). 
 259. See supra notes 217-19 and accompanying text. 
 260. Henry, supra note 212, at 340. While the Canadian practice addresses value to the 
“licensee,” this Comment places the issuing government in this role since both are primari-
ly interested in minimizing acquisition costs. The only difference is that the licensee wish-
es to maximize profits while the issuing government wishes to maximize access. In both, 
the means are the same because lower total acquisition costs act as an enabler to achieve 
the desired end. 
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lied on in absence of other considerations. To do so would not serve 
innovation well,261 but they are options that Canada has employed to 
improve access to drugs in the past. 
 For example, when compensating the patent holder for the re-
search and promotion costs of a particular drug, Canadian courts li-
mited research costs to those leading to the invention and did not in-
clude any compensation for failures.262 Furthermore, the courts did 
not compensate for promotion costs, and they specifically excluded 
postinvention expenses.263 
 Instead, Canadian practice surveyed the market landscape, tak-
ing account of the prior art, commercial surveys, and other market 
conditions,264 and it focused on the total sum of the potential royalties 
over the life of the license.265 In the end, most compulsory licenses re-
sulted in an arbitrarily assessed rate of four percent266 or fifteen per-
cent,267 depending upon the royalty’s compensation base.268 
 Using these practices as a guide, a court desiring to lower a poten-
tial royalty to increase access can easily do so, but it should not rely 
on these practices in isolation. Instead, a court should only rely on 
the Canadian model in conjunction with the British model. In this 
way, a court can temper what some economists have described as the 
Canadian courts’ tendency to undercompensate the patent holder 
and to harm innovation.269 For this reason, while Canadian practices 
cannot provide a complete solution to the compensation equation, 
they do provide courts a balancing tool. That is, when balancing the 
need for access in developing countries with innovation incentives, a 
court can look to Canadian practices to reduce the overall royalty 
and, in doing so, can ensure that the capacity to pay does not remain 
a barrier to medicinal access. 
                                                                                                                     
 261. See Grabowski, supra note 66, at 855 (noting that the historical Canadian ap-
proach “strongly discouraged investment in . . . domestic industry”). 
 262. See Henry, supra note 212, at 340 (noting that this research component could be 
nonexistent in the final royalty calculation). 
 263. Id. at 340-41. 
 264. Id. at 341. 
 265. See, e.g., Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Frank W. Horner Ltd., [1970] 65 C.P.R. 93, 
112 (Can.). 
 266. Henry, supra note 212, at 341. This figure is also very similar to at least one pro-
posal for “adequate remuneration” that suggests rates between three percent and five per-
cent based on international comparisons and proposals from pharmaceutical representa-
tives. See Lang, supra note 202, at 353. 
 267. Henry, supra note 212, at 341 n.63. 
 268. Royalty-based options are discussed infra Part IV.C.3. Under the Canadian mod-
el, a four percent royalty is applied to the net selling price, and a fifteen percent royalty is 
applied to the bulk sale price. See Henry, supra note 212, at 341. 
 269. See, e.g., J.R. Geigy S.A.’s Patent, [1964] R.P.C. 391, 406 (U.K.) (calculating the 
royalty to be sixteen percent of the drug’s selling price in the U.K., which would exceed the 
four percent rate applied to the selling price of the drug in Canada); see Grabowski, supra 
note 66, at 855 (noting that the historical Canadian approach “strongly discouraged in-
vestment in . . . domestic industry”). 
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3.   Determining a Compensation Base 
 Two options exist for the compensation base, and because both 
have their own implications, both should be considered in light of the 
royalty rate when balancing access rights with innovation incentives. 
 One option for the compensation base is the selling price of the 
drug as defined on an annual treatment or per dosage basis.270 Using 
this option for a royalty base ties the royalty to the current market 
price and favors access rights because the royalty will decrease as 
the license’s effect permeates throughout the local market. In other 
words, after a court issues the compulsory license, generics will 
quickly enter the market and cause a drop in the market price.271 
Over time, prices will continue to drop as supply increases to satisfy 
demand, and this will increase access, but it will also decrease the 
patent holder’s royalty.272 To repair this effect, some courts in the 
United Kingdom relied upon future projections to calculate an “up-
lift” percentage that would offset the corresponding reductions and 
align the total royalty with its intended value.273 Courts concerned 
with innovation effects and attempting to balance rights under 
TRIPS can easily do the same. 
 In the alternative, a second and innovation-friendlier option uses 
the price-per-kilogram, or bulk sale price, of the active, manufac-
tured substance as the compensation base. This alternative insulates 
the patent holder from market price reductions and ensures some 
stability because the bulk sale price is relatively stable in comparison 
to the dosage price.274 On the other hand, it may have a harmful side 
effect and keep prices artificially high,275 and in light of this, a court 
may wish to adjust the compensation base or royalty rate accordingly. 
4.   Validating the Whole: Ensuring that Remuneration Is 
“Adequate” 
 Finally, a court striving to weigh these factors in an effort to  
balance innovation and access requires some form of validation to 
judge the reasonableness of the final assessment. Under U.S. law, 
royalties are validated by comparing the royalty to what has been 
                                                                                                                     
 270. See Henry, supra note 212, at 335-36. 
 271. See, e.g., Marques et al., supra note 118, at 474 (reflecting the market price reduc-
tions that follow compulsory license awards). 
 272. See F. Hoffman-La Roche & Co. A.G.’s Patent, [1973] R.P.C. 601, 608-09 (U.K.). 
 273. Henry, supra note 212, at 336. 
 274. See id. (describing the effect of this alternative as ensuring the patentee receives 
full and adequate recovery for the associated costs in developing and marketing the drug, 
which otherwise could be defeated by the decreasing royalty amounts that result from de-
creasing prices in a competitive market). 
 275. See J.R. Geigy S.A.’s Patent, [1964] R.P.C. 391, 402 (U.K.) (discussing how this al-
ternative might keep prices higher despite the compulsory license). 
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gained and lost from each side.276 Therefore, since U.S. law provides 
the baseline for this analysis, assessments of the license’s “economic 
value” from the perspectives of the issuing government and the pa-
tent holder are necessary. 
 Beginning with the issuing government, a court analyzing the 
reasonableness of its economic value determinations should assess 
the savings to the government and its needy consumers. While such 
savings are not awardable to the patent holder, they are an accepta-
ble measure of the royalty’s reasonableness and should give an indi-
cation of its effect on public access.277 This then should be compared 
to the license’s economic value to the patent holder. In this regard, 
when evaluating the patent holder’s economic value, a court should 
assess the profits that have been lost by comparing expected profits if 
the license had not been issued to the expected profits that will result 
from the license.278 In this way, a court can evaluate the profit diffe-
rential and rudimentarily forecast the potential effects on innovation 
since profits fund current research. 
 Consideration of this last factor, lost expected profits, has an add-
ed benefit. It encourages Ramsey pricing—a practice that is pre-
ferred because it tends to set price points in a way that maximizes 
access to essential drugs.279 A patent holder who sells a patented 
drug in a country at a price that substantially limits access will lose 
less profit when a court issues a compulsory license, and if there is 
little profit expectation from a particular market, then it is not likely 
to fund future research. This means that the loss of that market 
should not hinder innovation. If Ramsey pricing is used, then a pa-
tent holder aims to maximize profits within a particular market by 
setting a lower price,280 making it more likely that the market will 
fund future innovation efforts. Therefore, when lost expected profits 
                                                                                                                     
 276. Leesona Corp. v. United States, 599 F.2d 958, 973 (Ct. Cl. 1979) (“[O]ne way to 
monitor the reasonableness and fairness of our determination of just compensation is to 
compute the award by estimating a reasonable royalty on a proper compensation base, and 
then test this award by an examination of other available measures—savings to the gov-
ernment, lost profits, etc.”). 
 277. See id. at 971 (discussing the role of savings to the government within the as-
sessment of royalties under 28 U.S.C. § 1498). 
 278. The profits discussed here, however, are distinguishable from the “full market 
value” measure of lost profits discussed previously. See supra notes 193-95 and accompany-
ing text. Here, the lost profits discussed refer to the profit the patent holder expected from 
the lost market, not the actual lost profit per dose, and are a function of access within the 
affected market. Furthermore, under U.S. law, which supplies the foundation for this 
analysis, actual lost profits are not available as a remedy under an eminent domain taking. 
Instead, they are only available as a remedy under a tort theory of damages. See, e.g., Pan-
duit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1156 (6th Cir. 1978) (discuss-
ing how lost profits are obtained in a private infringement action under 35 U.S.C. § 284). 
 279. See generally Scherer & Watal, supra note 194, at 925-28 (discussing Ramsey pric-
ing and the benefits it provides in providing access to medicines in the developing world). 
 280. Id. at 927. 
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are high, a higher royalty is warranted, but when they are low, the 
opposite is true. 
V.   CONCLUSION 
 Admittedly, the above interpretation of “adequate remuneration” 
is a complex determination. For this reason, some may critique it as 
impractical and disfavored in light of simpler, more straightforward 
solutions.281 For those who do, it is worthwhile to note that the stan-
dard above is not complex without reason. 
 One reason for such complexity lies in the difficulty of accurately 
valuating patented technology. As this Comment previously de-
scribed, in some circumstances courts can avoid this difficulty by is-
suing injunctions and by relying on parties to negotiate the valuation 
issue outside of court, but in the TRIPS context, this alternative is 
unavailable. Instead, when an issuing government compels licensing 
of a patent through a compulsory license, negotiation opportunities 
are lost, and only the compensation decision remains. 
 Another reason for the complexity resides in the nature of TRIPS. 
By requiring that each license reflect its “individual merits” and its 
“economic value,” TRIPS makes bright-line standards unpalatable 
and necessitates a factual, case-by-case analysis. This becomes even 
more necessary when recognizing that “adequate remuneration” 
must balance the interests of innovation and access. The divergence 
of these two interests leaves a court bridging a gap that may at first 
appear insurmountable, but by making individual trade-offs in light 
of the circumstances of each individual case, a court can build a 
bridge that may not be perfect, but can work. 
 Finally, “adequate remuneration” is complex because it ensures 
that compulsory licenses are available, but not abused. When  
compensation for patented technology is minimal, it encourages 
countries to take the expedient route, avoiding negotiation with the 
patent holder and shifting costs in the process. This, in turn, can re-
sult in trade sanctions or other forms of international retaliation 
from those countries that have the most to lose in terms of trade. In 
the end, the license is halted despite the issuing country’s capacity to 
pay, and without the license, drugs remain out of reach, suffering 
continues, and the international solution to issues of public health be-
comes meaningless. 
 When compensation is “adequate,” as based on a number of fac-
tors derived from the source agreement, however, costs may still be 
shifted, but they are also minimized. Consequently, the likelihood 
                                                                                                                     
 281. See, e.g., supra note 202 (listing alternative compensation schemes based on prin-
ciples of administration capacity and certainty). 
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that the license will impact ongoing research is greatly diminished, 
as is the incentive for protectionist behavior in the international are-
na. Developed countries, for example, that would otherwise block a 
compulsory license to preserve their trade advantages have less in-
centive to do so when their innovators are fairly compensated. Simi-
larly, countries with the capacity to pay for pharmaceutical technolo-
gy have no incentive to issue a compulsory license to bolster their 
domestic pharmaceutical industries when the attendant compensa-
tion fairly denies them the advantage they seek. This not only pre-
serves the international solution, but it also preserves compulsory li-
censes as a viable alternative for those countries that need them most. 
 The method that this Comment presents is complex for all of these 
reasons, but especially because it strives to satisfy today’s short-term 
needs without sacrificing those of tomorrow. Because access and in-
novation are intertwined, the necessity of a sufficient royalty is pa-
ramount to seeing that the former does not sacrifice the latter and 
vice versa. In other words, the compensation scheme described here, 
by providing a path for meeting our present needs without risking 
the future’s, saves tomorrow from today. 
